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Preface
The Political Organization and Parties Section of the American Political
Science Association sponsored the first of perhaps many research workshops
on Wednesday, August 28, 1991. Entitled "Machine Politics, Soundbites, and
Nostalgia: Substantive Issues and Methodological Problems in the Study of
Party Organization," the workshop included a panel of scholars presenting
brief papers on research questions and a panel of practitioners responding
from their personal experience. The results of these panels are included in
this publication, the goal of which is to make the results of the workshop
available to students of political parties.
This first workshop was the product of several years of discussion and
many months of preparation. Special recognition must be given to the
leadership of POP, particularly Margaret Conway, Chair of the section, Ruth
Jones, the Program Chair. Michael Margolis served with distinction as the
Workshop Coordinator, while Paul Herrnson provided invaluable assistance
in organizing the panels, and Michael Brintnall of the APSR contributed
logistical support. We are grateful to the participating scholars and
practitioners who graciously consented to have their remarks reprinted here.
Special thanks goes to Kimberly Haverkamp of the Bliss Institute for her
careful work on the manuscript.
The Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics is a bipartisan research
institute at The University of Akron, dedicated to understanding the "nuts and
bolts" of practical politics with a particular emphasis on political parties. Thus
we are pleased to help make the results of the POP workshop available to the
broader community of scholars. We hope to provide a similar service for
future POP workshops.
John C. Green, Director
Bliss Institute
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PART ONE

Scholarly Perspectives

1

Overview of Research on
Party Organizations
Leon D. Epstein

Asked to discuss briefly the state of research on party organizations,
principaUy understood as state and local organizations, I shall first comment
generally and then cite only a few studies to illustrate the extensive scholarly
literature on the subject.
My perspective these days is principally that of a synthesizing user of the
organizational research conducted by others. It is about 35 years since I
studied party organizations in Wisconsin counties, employing interviews, mail
questionnaires, and participant-observations (Epstein 1958: Chapter 5). That
experience, together with a nearly simultaneous study of candidate-selection
practices of British constituency associations, convinced me of both the value
and the arduousness of such research. At the time of my Wisconsin work,
political scientists in other states were also studying the new ideological
activist organizations that seemed to be replacing patronage parties. Some of
these studies, completed in the early 1960s, were widely recognized as
important scholarship; striking examples are the books written by Samuel
Eldersveld (1964) and James Q. Wilson (1962). Their work maintained a
traditional professional concern with party organizations as key elements in
understanding the democratic political process. That concern goes back to
Ostrogorski (1902) and Michels (1915), and it includes landmark studies of
old party machines like Chicago's (Gosnell 1937). Surely, the profession's
concern with the subject persists, as all of us know and as I shall emphasize
in discussing work of the last decade. Nevertheless, studies of party
organizations appear less salient since the mid-1960s or thereabouts. I mean
not only less salient in political science generally, where of course the
development of many new fields reduces the relative importance of parties,
but also less salient even within the parties field itself. I believe that more
time and energy are devoted to party systems, party competition, party voters,
party identifiers, and legislative parties than to extra-governmental party
organizations.
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Perhaps research on party organizations, especially at state and local
levels, has not been the readiest path to fame and fortune for political
scientists during the last quarter century. That supposition can he supported
by at least one crude measure: among 238 articles and research notes
appearing in twenty issues of the American Political Science Review during a
recent five-year period (March 1986 through December 1990), only one-a
research note-was devoted to extra-governmental party organization at any
level in the United States or elsewhere. This statistic may reflect more than
the fact that party organization is but one of the multitude of subjects now
attracting political scientists. Research on organizations ordinarily requires
field work, either by a principal investigator or through specially developed
survey instruments, while scholars are understandably tempted by inquiries
that can be pursued by using already available data from established surveys,
documents, and secondary sources, or by philosophical and methodological
work for which no empirically-derived data are needed. Thus, only a modest
percentage ofAPSR articles on any subject, I once observed in the mid-1980s,
contain newly gathered data from elite interviews, participant-observation, or
specially developed surveys or questionnaires (as distinct from national surveys
used in many voting-behavior articles).
The very state and local character of party organizations may also help
account for the subject's lack of prominence. Political scientists, like many
Americans, are likely to be more interested in national than in state and local
affairs. To some extent, that interest is reflected in useful and important
studies of national party organizations. Their recent expansion surely justifies
attention, and the availability of campaign finance data from the Federal
Election Commission facilitates relevant research. Hence, it is harder than
ever to persuade a Ph.D. candidate in the parties field to forgo the greater
visibility of a national study in favor of studying state and local organizations.
Yet good reasons remain for looking to sub-national units for most party
organizational activity. We are far from certain that state and local parties
have declined as conventional wisdom suggests, and we still know too little
about the non-patronage organizations that have developed, ever since the
1950s, to serve different purposes from those of the old machines. Several
examples of new developments will be found in the excellent studies in
Pomper (1980).
Characteristic of most recent scholarship is the realization that party
organizations have had to accommodate to a candidate-centered political
culture and particularly to a nominating process that they cannot control but
may seek only to influence. The significance of this point is readily
understood in comparative context. Everywhere outside the United States,
party organizations, at one level or another but usually local or regional,
control the bestowing of their party labels; that is to say, dues paying party
members or their chosen executive committees select (nominate) candidates.
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Only in the United States do laws tum over candidate selection by parties to
voters, whose commitment to party is no more than a legal registration or
declaration in order to participate in primaries. Direct-primary laws, apart
from their other effects, are thus widely believed to have reduced the power
of party organizations and therefore also to have reduced a principal
motivation for individuals to become regular and active party members.
In this context are many studies of how party organizations cope with
nominating problems in the late twentieth-century American environment.
Malcolm Jewell (1984) provides a leading example in his careful exploration
of five of the several states whose parties used endorsing conventions to
influence gubernatorial primaries in 1982. Viewing the pre-primary endorsing
convention as an increasingly popular device for party activists, Jewell finds
it to have organizational advantages, measured in part by the satisfaction that
convention delegates expressed about their roles when answering
questionnaires. Success in winning primaries for endorsed choices was,
however, by no means uniform. Nor, it should be added, was organizational
control of nominations anywhere near uniform during previous decades of
direct-primary experience. Thus, Mayhew (1986) shows that traditional party
organizations, while surviving in strength until the 1960s, had not been
pervasively present and effective (even earlier in the century).
Most of the organizational research from the 1980s that I have
encountered does not deal directly with Jewell's subject. More typical, I
believe, is the use of surveys to learn about the backgrounds, motivations, and
activities of party members. Crotty (1986) has edited an excellent set of
studies of party committee members in five cities (Chicago, Detroit, Los
Angeles, Houston, and Nashville). Among the findings are: continuing and
even increasing activity during recent years in the first three cities; better
Republican than Democratic organization in Houston and sometimes
elsewhere; greater non-patronage incentives except in Chicago, with
motivations most often provided by policy commitments; an adaptability of
party organizations to changing ethnic populations; and a general loyalty of
activists to their party despite their own occasional ticket-splitting.
Incidentally, Crotty's book includes a chapter by Eldersveld that exemplifies
his continuing research leadership in the party organizational field.
Inferentially at least, the relatively substantial organizational activity
reported by the several studies in Crotty suggest that incentives for party
participation remain despite the impact of the direct primary and of
candidate-centered politics. Indeed, in Los Angeles the weakness of
organizational power in matters like nominations is specifically cited to
indicate that activists are attracted despite the weakness. A similar point is
more explicit in Mildred Schwartz's study of the Illinois Republican Party
(1990). She rejects the view of Mayhew (1986) and the Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations (1986) that the older control of nominations
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is a key criterion in measuring organizational success. Thus, Schwartz finds
that the Illinois Republican organization is effective even though its role in
nominating contests falls short of regular control of outcomes. Her research
is notable for its many and repeated interviews with various sets of party
actors at various levels; these actors include government officeholders as well
as party committee members. They supply both tabular data and apt
quotations.
With its focus on a state party organization. Schwartz's work, as one
reviewer (Flinn 1991) points out, may represent a shift from the conventional
belief in the centrality of the county organization in the American party
system. Schwartz is not alone in studying state organizations during the last
decade. Jewell has been noted already. And there is also the NSF-funded,
nation-wide Party Transfonnation Study by Cotter, Gibson, Bibby, and
Huckshom (1984), best known for its measures of the organizational strength
and the professional bureaucratization of the several state parties. It does,
however, devote a substantial chapter to local party organizations, in which
the authors report considerable county-level activity bolstering the book's
principal thesis that party organizations have not recently declined but have
in some respects become more significant since the 1960s. Thus, even if state
parties have become a primary focus for organizational research, local parties
remain within the scope of inquiry. An apt illustration is provided by the one
piece on party organization that I found in the twenty issues of the APSR
noted earlier; it was a research note on "111e Electoral Relevance of Local
Party Organizations" by Frendreis, Gibson, and Vertz (1990) and it drew on
data from the Party Transfonnation Study.
The Party Transfonnation Study, in its several published products,
illustrates another characteristic of recent research on party organizations: an
emphasis on gathering information that can be quantified and tabulated. For
Cotter, Gibson. Bibby, and Huckshorn. numerous questionnaires produced this
kind of information, although their research also involved interviews with
certain party officials. Mail questionnaires are reasonably economic means
for learning about party activists, and they have been used along with personal
interviews in the several well-known studies of national convention delegates.
Large-scale work of this kind is by Miller and Jennings (1986), and in Miller
(1988). They have returns from Republican and Democratic delegates to the
conventions of 1972 through 1984, and accordingly a wealth of data on their
degree of party commitment, class background, motivational bases, and
ideological positions. On the last of these, in particular, Miller and Jennings
are able to show significant differences not only between Republican and
Democratic delegates but also between each party's delegates and its electoral
supporters (whose opinions are revealed in established surveys of the national
electorate). Their work is perhaps the most elaborate of the several national
convention delegate studies that began thirty years ago. Although such studies
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do not directly explore what party organizations do. they certainly tell us a
good deal about the nature of party organizations-or at least about the nature
of presidential party organizations. County chairs, Baer and Bositis (1988)
have found. are ideologically distinguishable, especially on the Democratic
side. from national convention delegates.
Referring to Baer and Bositis reminds me to observe that their book
includes, along with research data. a useful discussion of how crucial
organizational studies are to the maintenance of a distinguishable parties
field. Without such studies. we might have only party-related research in
other fields-legislative behavior, presidential or gubernatorial leadership, and
voting behavior. Tendencies in that direction may help explain recent
departmental difficulties in recruiting parties specialists among new Ph.Os.
Already, scholars primarily identified with other fields do a large share of the
research of concern to students of parties. For example. legislative behavior
specialists have much to tell us about the recently strengthened legislative
parties, particularly their campaign committees. The importance of these
office-holder parties. as well as those of governors and presidents, is apparent.
and so is their often vexed relationship to ideologically oriented extragovernmental parties. Nothing. of course, precludes parties specialists from
studying office-holder parties along with extra-governmental parties. and some
of us have tried to do so.
Yet. it seems clear that it is the extra-governmental organizations that lie
at the heart of our field. It is also clear that a renewed concern with these
organizations must be based on evidence of their actual activity. Are they
substantial and active enough so as to be effective in a candidate-centered
political culture? Here. recent research findings are reassuring. All of the
scholarship that I have observed, in this paper and elsewhere, points to a
continuing and even increasing organizational presence. Only the most
skeptical would dismiss the findings as products of an over-identification of
scholars with the subject matter of their research. It is true that party scholars
welcome the signs of strength that they discover, and that a few even share
and seek to promote the organizational activism that they study.
Nevertheless. the scholarly evidence is persuasive at least with respect to the
presence of substantial numbers of activists committed to party organizations.
Less but still something is known about influence in nominations and election
campaigns. To learn as much about the latter as about the characteristics and
beliefs of organizational participants will require field work in addition to the
sample surveys and mail questionnaires that now provi~e impressive
quantifiable data.
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Political Parties and Congressional Elections:
Out of the Eighties and Into the Nineties

Paul S. Hermson

The 1980s were banner years for party organizations in the United States.
They followed a twenty-year period in which the parties were routinely
described as moribund and lacking the organizational strength to play a
significant role in elections. During the late 1970s and early 1980s the parties
began to exhibit new Ufe, increasing their treasuries, organizational capacities,
and campaign-related activities. In the mid-1980s, the parties continued to
develop, improving their campaign strategies and learning to target their
resources more effectively. As the 1990s approached, however, party activity
began to decline from the heights exhibited in the middle of the decade,
leaving political observers to speculate whether the parties' revitalization was
little more than a short-term phenomenon that would fade away along with
the intense political competition associated with the Reagan era. This essay
explores some of the developments associated with the strengthening of
American party organizations in the 1980s, speculates about how we can
expect the parties to fare in the 1990s, and suggests some new directions for
research. It focuses on party organizations at the national level-the
Democratic and Republican national, congressional, and senatorial campaign
committees-and their roles in congressional elections.

Recent Trends
The Democratic and Republican national, congressional, and senatorial
campaign committees exhibited new vitality during the late 1970s and early
1980s. They improved their fundraising, increased their institutional
resources, and expanded their roles in congressional elections. Later in the
decade, the parties suffered some financial setbacks as a result of a general
slump in direct-mail fundraising. Yet they remained major players in
congressional elections.
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Fundraising. Party fundraising improved greatly during the late 1970s and
early 1980s. Several patterns are evident in the data presented in Table 2.1.
The Republicans consistently raised far more money than the Democrats.
Democratic and Republican national committee (DNC and RNC) receipts
followed a four-year cycle, rising in presidential election years and falling
during midterm years. Republican revenues peaked at $245.9 million in 1984
and then declined.1 Democratic revenues peaked four years later at $81.1
million, and then fell by nearly half.
The trends in party finances are closely tied to developments in direct-mail
fundraising. The Federal Election Campaign Act and its amendments
(FECA), and improvements in computer technology, provided the parties with
both the incentives and the means to raise small sums of money from large
groups of people. The new law placed a ceiling of $20,000 per year on
individual contributions to the national parties and effectively barred unions,
corporations, and other groups from contributing treasury money to the
parties' federal campaign accounts, thereby depriving the parties of some
traditional sources of revenue.2 Advances in data processing, high-speed
printing, and reduced postage rates made direct-mail fundraising highly
feasible and more attractive. This confluence of forces encouraged the parties
to aggressively pursue small contributions from middle-class supporters. By
1980 the RNC, which bad experimented with a large-scale direct-mail
fundraising program in the 1960s, succeeded in raising roughly 70 percent of
its budget in the form of contributions averaging about $29 (Adamany 1984).
Table 21 National Party Organizatioa Receipts, 1976-1990 (in millions)

Party

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

S l3.1
.9
1.0
S 15.0

S 11.3

S 15.4

S 16.S

S 52.3

6.5
5.6
S 1.8.6

$46.6
10.4
8.9
$65.9

$17.2

29
1.7
$20,0

12.3

125

l3.4
$429

16.3
$81.1

$14.5
9.1
17.s
$41.1

S 29.1

$34.2
14.1
10.9
$59.2

S 77.8

$84.1
58.0
48.9
$191.0

$105.9
58.3
81.7
$245.9

S 83.8

S91.0
34.S
65.9
S191.4

$ 68.7
33.8
65.1
$167.6

Democratu:

DNC
DCCC
DSCC
Total

28
.3

S 14.4

&publican

RNC

NRCC
NRSC
Total

12.2
1.8
$43.1

20.3
6.0
S120.4

Source: Federal Election Commissioa.

39.8
86.1
$209.7
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Other Republican national organizations also raised large sums from direct
mail.
The Democratic committees never matched the Republicans'
direct-mail fundraising record, but by 1984 they, too, had successfully raised
substantial sums in small contributions.
When the direct-mail fundraising industry began to founder in the late
1980s, the parties experimented with telephone solicitations, geodemographic
targeting, and other innovations to try to reverse the decline in small
contributions. They also turned increasingly to wealthy contributors for
support, and began to rely more on fundraising dinners, cocktail parties, and
other traditional approaches. Nevertheless, large contributions have not
completely offset the decline in small contributions.
Infrastructure and Staff. Good fiscal health provided the foundation for
major organizational development during the late 1970s and
early-to-mid-1980s.
Specialization, professionalism, and organizational
expansion became the orders of the day at the parties' national, congressional,
and senatorial campaign committees (Cotter and Bibby 1980; Conway 1983;
Kayden and Mahe 1985; Herrnson 1988; Sabato 1988; Frantzich 1989). The
decade began with onJy two organizations. the RNC and the National
Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), housed in party-owned
buildin~ Following the 1984 election, the three Democratic national party
organizations moved into the new Democratic Headquarters Building. The
National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) moved into the plush
Ronald Reagan Center in December of 1988. The headquarters buildings
provide the committees with convenient and secure locations for holding
fundraising events, conducting meetings, and housing computer, radio,
television, and other campaign equipment. For many political practitioners
and observers, the buildings have come to symbolize the emergence of
national party organizations as important players in electoral politics.
National party staffing folJowed trends similar to those for party fundraising,
both in terms of growth and professionalism. The RNC, NRCC, and NRSC
had a total of 40 full-time employees in 1972, enjoyed continuous staff growth
through 1984, and then experienced a mixed pattern of cut backs and growth
(see Table 2.2). The Democratic committees, which like to bill themselves as
"lean, mean political machines," employed a total of 39 full-time staff in 1972
and peaked at 290 employees in 1988, after which the DNC and DSCC
enacted modest staff cuts. With the exception of some administrative staff,
most employees were, and continue to be, skilled political professionals who
performed fundraising, research, communications, and campaign activities.
The staffs played critical roles in strategic planning, advising candidates,
distributing campaign money and services, as well as fundraising and running
the committees' day-to-day operations throughout the 1980s.
Campaign Assistance. Party support for congressional candidates reached
unprecedented levels in the 1980s. Party contributions to House candidates,
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Table 2.2 National Party Staffs, 1972-1990
Party Committee

1m

1976

1980

1984

1988

1990

30

30
6

130

l(i(l

130

45
32

80

80

255

Democ:rrllic

DNC

DCCC

s

DSCC
Total

4

s

40
2ii
20

39

41

86

'Jif1

50
290

30
6

700
8
6
214

350
40
30
420

600

425

130

80

90
820

593

Rtpublicon
RNC

NRCC
NRSC

Total

4

40

88

45

400
110
101
611

Scxur:e: Estimates provided by committee staffs.

whom the American Political Science Association's Committee on Political
Parties (19S0) once likened to the "orphans of the political system," were
generally above $3.5 millions dollars per e1ection cyc1c, peaking at $6.1
miUion in 1982 (see Table 2.3). Party contributions to Senate candidates
were consistently above $1.1 million. peaking at $1.4 million in 1986. Most
of the party contributions were made by the congressional and senatorial
campaign committees. Candidates in competitive contests typically received
close to the maximum allowable general election contribution ($15,000 for
House candidates and $22,500 for Senate candidates);3 less competitive
candidates were given smaller amounts:'
Coordinated expenditures, which consist of campaign services the parties
give to candidates' campaigns, were originally limited to $20,000 per House
candidate in 1974 and arc adjusted for inflation.5 The ceilings grew to
$50,280 per candidate in the 1990 election. The limits for coordinated
expenditures in Senate elections vary by the size of a state's voting age
population and arc also adjusted for inflation. In 1990, they ranged from
$100,560 in the smallest states to $1,210,542 in Texas. If an e1ection had been
held in California, the limit in that state would have been $2,146,956.
Coordinated spending in House races peaked at $8.1 million in 1984; it
peaked in Senate races at roughly $16.9 million in 1988 (see Table 2.3). From
1984 through 1990, most House candidates involved in close races and
virtually every Senate candidate in a reasonably competitive contest benefitted
from the maximum allowable coordinated expenditure.6 The Republicans
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Table 23 Party Spending in Congressional Elections, 1980-1990 (in thousands)

Party

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

$ 1,085

$1,140

315

792

$1,400

$1,932

$1,322
1,820
$3,142

$ 1,008
1,956
$2,964

$1,259
2,891
$4,150

$ 941
3;1,IJ7
$4,208

$3$7

$4,989

$4,'1I17

2,JSl

S,543

$6,164

$10,532

6,300
$10,516

$2,612
4,194
S 7,806

$2,657
4,162
S 6,819

$2,027
$ 3,001
$ S,028

$

s

$

$ 649
6,657
S 7,306

$ 502
6,592
$ 7,CYJ4

$

$ 786
10,128
$10,914

$ 719

House
Demoaalic
Contn"butions
Coord. Expenditures
Total

Republican
Conln"butiom
Coord. Expenditures
Total

Senate
Democratic
Contn"butions
Coord. Expenditures
Total

583
2,403
$2,986

546

476

4,40S

1,216
$1,762

$4,881

S 637

$ 701

$

8,742
S 9,379

S,454
$ 6,15S

Republican
Contributions
Coord. Expenditures
Total

667
6,673
$7,340

10,1.61
$10,980

S10

5,193
$5,703

s 859
7,721
s 8,580

Source: Federal Elc:ction Commission.

distributed more coordinated expenditures and campaign contributions than
the Democrats throughout the 1980s, but this gap has been narrowing.
The FECA limits on campaign spending have thus far made it impossible
for some party committees to allocate all of their campaign money to close
contests. The law has encouraged the parties to spend some funds in
elections that are not very competitive. The NRSC, which has raised
enormous amounts of money throughout the decade, has repeatedly been in
the predicament of having access to more funds than it could legally spend
without giving some support to noncompetitive candidates. As a result, it has
pioneered the search for loopholes in the campaign finance Jaw.
In the 1988, a loophole was discovered that enabled the parties to spend
additional campaign money in close elections using a practice called
"crossover spending." Under this practice, the parties' congressional campaign
committees made contributions to Senate candidates. the senatorial campaign
committees made contributions to House candidates, and some state party
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organizations gave money to candidates running outside of their state. The
Republicans distributed over $185,000 and the Democrats just under $100,000
in crossover spending to 12 House candidates running in special elections in
1989.7
Parties distribute some of their campaign contributions and all of their
coordinated expenditures in the form of campaign commercials, polls, or other
technical services. During the 1980s, these services were routinely assigned
a monetary value that was well below their true market cost, enabling the
partie3 to increase the amount of assistance they delivered to candidates in
tight contests (Hermson 1988). Other forms of party assistance were not
subject to the FECA's limits, including providing candidates with strategic
advice or assistance with hiring political consultants.
Party organizations also played a critical role in helping candidates raise
money from political action committees (PACs) and individual contributors.
Throughout the last decade, the congressional and senatorial campaign
committees hosted receptions to introduce their most viable challengers and
open-seat contestants to PAC managers and other potential big contributors.
They also routinely mailed, telephoned, and faxed information about very
close contests to PACs and wealthy individuals. In 1990, the NRSC had
access to more money than it could legally spend in competitive races, so it
organized a joint fundraising committee and used its major donor list to help
50 GOP Senators and Senate candidates raise $2 million (Alston 1990). Party
efforts to channel campaign money to competitive candidates were most
helpful to non-incumbents running for the House, most of whom possessed
less fundraising skill than incumbents, lacked the clout that comes with
incumbency, and began their elections virtually unknown to many PACs and
wealthy individuals.
In addition to providing assistance directly to congressional candidates,
national party organizations have also delivered indirect support as part of
what is commonly referred to as the "coordinated campaign." This generic,
party-focused campaign is designed to help the party's entire ticket. It consists
of television and radio advertisements, as well as voter registration efforts,
get-out-the-vote drives, and other grassroots projects that have not been
subject to the FECA's fundraising and spending limits because they do not
mention federal candidates by name. Most of the money used in the
coordinated campaign has been raised in the form of "soft money" at the
national level, and spent by state and local party committees.8
Party strategy has changed since the late 1970s. Prior to the strengthening
of the national party organizations, most party campaign activity in
congressional elections consisted of small contributions to incumbents. During
the 1980s, the national parties became increasingly committed to helping
challengers and open-seat candidates. District competitiveness, candidate
experience, and campaign quality became important criteria for determining
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the distribution of party money and campaign services to individual candidates
(Jacobson 1985-86; Herrnson 1989). Political conditions and events, such
as presidential popularity and the state of the economy. also influenced the
parties' overall strategies (Jacobson and Kernell 1981).
Over the course of the decade, the parties became more adept at
determining which elections were most likely to be competitive. Improved
organizational resources and greater experience in distributing campaign
assistance encouraged the congressional campaign committees to focus their
efforts on fewer races. The number of House elections the committees
categorized as "opportunity" or "first tier" races shrank from about 100 in 1984
to 40 in 1990, and the distribution of party assistance became more
concentrated (Herrnson 1991). A similar trend was not exhibited by the
senatorial campaign committees because of the smaller number of Senate
contests in each election cycle, their higher degree of competitiveness, the
higher quality of the candidates who run, and the relative financial strength
of the senatorial campaign committees.
Predictions for the 1990s

It is always risky to attempt to predict the future, and academics are usually
reluctant to do so. Still, the trends exhibited during the last decade, and
interviews held with a small group of national party staffers, provide some
basis for speculating about the future of the national party organizations and
their roles in congressional elections.
Fundraising. It is doubtful that the parties will enjoy levels of financial
growth in the 1990s comparable with those experienced during the last
decade. The small contributions that were the foundation for the parties'
financial windfall have leveled off for a number of reasons. Over-prospecting
by the direct-mail industry has caused mail solicitations, including those from
the parties, to become regarded by many individuals as "junk mail" and
frequently thrown away unopened. The generational replacement of older
Americans also has deprived direct-mail fundraising of one of its most
responsive constituencies. The supplanting of confrontational, Reagan-era
public debate by the "kinder and gentler" rhetoric of George Bush and
congressional Democrats has robbed the parties of the kinds of extremist
appeals that are most effective in direct-mail fundraising. Moreover, the
Republicans' loss of control over the Senate and their failure to alter the
balance of power in the House have removed the sense of urgency that
surrounded electoral politics during the mid-1980s.
Although party fundraising has declined, it is unlikely that the national
parties will return to the relative poverty they endured for much of the
Twentieth Century. Small and moderate contributions can be expected to
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continue to account for substantial sums of money. Wealthy individuals and
PACs will probably remain responsive to the appeals of party leaders. Large
contributions can be expected to account for a larger portion of party funds
in the near future.
In addition, party leaders are beginning to explore some new approaches
to fill the national parties' coffers. The congressional and senatorial campaign
committees, for example, have recently explored some innovations that place
more of the burden for party fundraising on their primary constituents-House
members, Senators, and non-incumbent candidates. Following the 1990
election cycle, for example, the Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee (DCCC) set a precedent by retiring roughly one-half of its debt
with $600,000 in contributions collected directly from House Democrats.
The DSCC and NRSC are also considering a move to increase the
involvement of Senate candidates in campaign committee fundraising by
creating special group accounts that would be used to finance party spending
in the candidates' campaigns. The arrangement under consideration would
give the candidates some of the responsibility for collecting funds for the
group account from which they would receive contributions and coordinated
expenditures. The group accounts would enable the campaign committees to
take advantage of the fact that the parties can legally collect larger sums of
money than candidates from individuals and PACs. The accounts also would
allow the committees to capitalize on senatorial candidates', and especially
incumbent Senators', fundraising prowess. Group fundraising, it is believed,
would accomplish these goals without violating the FECA's prohibitions
against earmarking contributions for individual candidates. Barring a major
political crisis, the enactment of new campaign finance laws, or some other
unforeseeable event, it is probably safe to speculate that the national parties
will continue to exhibit fundraising patterns similar to those exhibited in the
late 1980s. The Republican committees will raise more money than their
Democratic counterparts, presidential elections will continue to influence
party fundraising, and both small and large contributions will remain
important.
Infrastructure and Staff. Virtually every recent national, congressional, or
senatorial campaign committee chairperson has sought to leave a personal
stamp on the committee he or she has overseen. Each has brought in new
staff and tried to make improvements. Political entrepreneurs like William
Brock of the RNC, Guy Vander Jagt of the NRCC, Charles Manatt of the
DNC, and Tony Coelho of the DCCC played critical roles in turning their
committees into major campaign service centers. Their successors have made
incremental improvements by adding new contributor clubs, installing
electronic bulletin boards, or adding satellite up-link capabilities and other
campaign equipment. Still, there are limits to what can be done to modernize

Political Parties and Congressional Elections

15

what are essentially modem facilities, especia11y when financial constraints are
taken into consideration.
It is unlikely that the 1990s will witness the same levels of organizational
growth that took place during the last decade, but it is also doubtful that the
parties will experience major retrenchment. Most of the staff cuts that took
place in the late 1980s occurred at the two national committees, and some are
attributable to the absence of a presidential campaign in 1990. The
committees will probably fill these "empty" positions as the 1992 election cycle
approaches. Rumblings heard after the 1990 race that the DCCC was going
to shut its media center as a cost-cutting measure were quickly dismissed after
Rep. Vic Fazio assumed the helm of the committee. It seems safe to predict
that in the coming decade, the Republican committees will continue to have
larger staffs and superior facilities, the Democrats will continue to distribute
more of their funds directly to congressional candidates, and both sets of
national party organizations will continue to harness new technology as it
becomes available.
Campaign Assistance. Fundraising shortfalls will probably make it difficult
for party organizations to match their previous levels of campaign activity
during the coming decade. Anti-incumbent sentiments among the electorate,
and the extremely low rates of challenger success in the 1980s, could also
influence the distribution of party resources. Party committees are less likely
to commit increasingly scarce resources to any but the most competitive
challengers, especially if political conditions work to heighten the electoral
insecurities of incumbents. This situation is unfortunate because nonincumbents, especially House challengers, were probably the biggest
beneficiaries of party assistance during the 1980s. House challengers' lack of
campaign experience, connections, and the strength of their incumbent
opponents typically resulted in PACs and other large contributors ignoring
their pleas for support. If party support for challengers and open-seat
candidates declines, then some quality House candidates will probably be
unable to wage credible campaigns, reinforcing the current pattern of high
reelection rates.
Funding difficulties also may result in the parties giving special
consideration to candidates who helped them raise money. Candidates who
helped the most may make big claims on party resources, especially in Senate
elections where the parties can spend extremely large sums.
Parties may make fewer crossover contributions during the 1990s. Some
party staff consider these to be "luxury" expenditures because they are given
to candidates whose campaigns fall under another party committee's
jurisdiction. It is likely that party committees will make crossover
contributions solely to candidates in highly competitive elections, and these
contributions will probably be given only after the committees have first
contributed to all of the close races in their state or legislative chamber.
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Resource limitations also may encourage a reduction in coordinated
campaigning. As long as the demand for federally allocable dollars remains
high, it is likely that the parties will spend most of this "hard" money on
federal candidates rather than on party-focused mass media advertising or
voter mobilization programs. These activities will probably be financed
mainly with soft money. The parties also can be expected to devote large
amounts of energy to helping candidates, especially those in marginal districts,
raise money from PACs and wealthy individuals.
It is important to note, however, that some party committees are still raising
more money than they can legally spend in competitive contests. These
committees will probably continue to under-report the market value of the
campaign services they distribute to candidates. The senatorial campaign
committees, especially the NRSC, can also be expected to continue to use
joint fundraising committees and other conduit activities, and to continue to
search for new ways to channel extra campaign money to candidates without
violating the FECA.
Lastly, despite their fundraising difficulties, party committees will probably
remain important sources of assistance for many candidates. Party
organizations can be expected to remain congressional candidates' best source
of the technical expertise, in-depth research, and political connections needed
to wage a viable campaign. PACs and wealthy individuals are not likely to
provide many House non-incumbents with these forms of assistance. Many
of these contributors are likely to stay with the incumbent-oriented strategies
they used throughout the 1980's.
New Directions ror Research

Nearly two decades have passed since the Watergate scandal encouraged
the Republicans to begin to develop their national party organizations. Over
ten years have passed since their 1980 landslide defeat encouraged the
Democrats to emulate the GOP's party-building program. Seven election
cycles have occurred for which we have computerized information about party
fundraising and spending in congressional elections. Yet a number of aspects
of party organizational development and campaign activity remain to be
explored. Some of these relate to the trends and speculations discussed
above.
We still do not know much about how political conditions-such as the state
of the economy, presidential popularity, international incidents, and public
opinion about government-influence party fundraising, especially direct-mail
solicitations and small contributions. Does the president's party derive any
fundraising advantages from a strong economy, a popular president, a victory
abroad, or a public backlash against Congress?
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We also do not know much about how party finances and redistricting
influence strategy or campaign activity. Do non- incumbents receive
disproportionately less support when party fundraising trails off? To whom
do the parties distribute most of their money in an election cycle that follows
the redrawing of House districts? Post-redistricting elections are typically
characterized by unusually anxious incumbents, large numbers of fonnidable
challengers, and many high quality, open-seat contestants. Do the
opportunities and uncertainties posed by redistricting influence the amounts
of money that are allocated to different types of candidates? The 1992
election cycle offers scholars an opportunity to address this question.
Longitudinal analyses of party receipts and expenditures could lead to a
deeper understanding of the influence of environmental forces on party
strength and campaign activity.
Further research on the impact of organizational factors-such as the goals
of party committee chairs, members, and staff-could also be instructive. One
could begin by examining the career aspirations of congressional campaign
committee chairs. Members of Congress are known to give campaign
contributions to each other in order to build support for leadership races and
prestigious committee assignments (Baker 1989; Wilcox 1989). How do these
same motivations influence the distribution of campaign committee money to
congressional candidates? One could also ask if the parties' increasing
reliance on wealthy individuals and PACs will influence the distribution of
campaign money to candidates.
Finally, there has been very little systematic research on the impact of party
activity on the behavior of PACs and individuals who make large
contributions. Do party spending and networking on behalf of candidates
really influence the flow of campaign money? Anecdotal evidence suggests
they do, but this hypothesis has yet to be systematically tested.
The Democratic and Republican national, congressional, and senatorial
campaign committees exhibited new vitality during the late 197Ds and early
198Ds. They improved their fundraising, increased their institutional
resources, and expanded their roles in congressional elections. Later in the
decade, the parties suffered some financial setbacks as a result of a general
slump in direct-mail fundraising. Yet they remained major players in
congressional elections. The national party organizations will probably
continue to adapt to the political environment and to play an important role
in congressional election campaigns during the 199Ds. Their institutional
development and campaign activity remain topics worthy of further study.
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Notes
1. These figures include only 'bard' money, which is allocable in federal elections. They do
not include "soft• money, which technically c:mts outside of the federal election system and
cannot be spent directly on federal candidates. Soft money can be used to improve the parties'
buildin~, computers, aad so forth, and caa be distnbutcd to state aad local party organizations
for party-building programs aad gnwroots campaign activities (sec Drew 1983; Sorauf 1988),
2. Previous law also prohibited corporations, unions, aad other groups from spending
treasury money ia federal clcctioas. However, the FECA created the first agency ta oversee
and enforce the law. The FECA docs allow corporations and other groups to contribute
treasury money to the building funds aad soft money accounts descnbcd in note 1.
3. These limits increased in 1988 after the Federal Election Commission permitted parties
lo make crOSSOYCr expenditures, which are discussed later ia the text.
4. An obvious exception to this is W1SCOnsia Senator Herbert Kohl, who accepted no party
money or expenditures in bis 1988 open-scat race for the Senate.
5. The figures for coordinated expenditures include the total allowed for state and national
party orgaail.ations. The limits for House elections in states that have oaly one House member
are equal to those for Senate elections in the same stale.
6. See note 4.
7. Figures calculated from Federal Election Commission (1990).
8. Sec note 1 for a discussion of soft money.
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The Organizational Strength of Political
Parties at the County Level: Preliminary Observations from
the Southern Grassroots Party Activists Project
Charles D. Hadley and Lewis Bowman

The paucity of scholarship on local political party organizations is evident
from the brief textbook examinations that focus primarily on state parties, and
include longer examinations of city political "machines" than contemporary
local parties (cf. Sorauf and Beck, 1988:91-94; Epstein. 1986:144-153;
Eldersveld, 1982:141-148,154-157). The primary scholarship examined in these
texts originated in the 1960s with Eldersveld's (1964) thorough study of Wayne
County, Michigan. and Wilson's (1962) analysis of the political club
movements in New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Though based on
a single county or city, Eldersveld (1986:89-119) and Marvick (1986:121-155)
extended their analyses through 1980 and beyond.1
Other information on local parties comes from studies of local party
leaders. For example, Beck (1974:1239-1241) analyzed the interaction oflocal
political party organization and its environment with a national random
sample of 123 Democratic and Republican Party county chairs in 1964. In the
pre-1965 Voting Rights Act era, he found both political parties in the South
better organized in the electorally competitive counties. Cotter, Gibson,
Bibby, and Huckshom (1984:57) went on to survey the 7,300 party county
chairs or their equivalents in all SO states. They concluded that most local
parties sustain relatively high levels of programmatic activity; that local party
strength varied significantly by state rather than by party; that local party
strength was relatively independent of state party strength; and, importantly,
that local parties were not less active than they were two decades earlier.
Along these lines, Mayhew (1986:196-332) exhaustively reviewed the literature
on state and local political parties, developed Traditional Party Organization
or party strength scores for each of the SO states, and analyzed them in
relation to several environmental factors.
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Still other scholars analyzed surveys with local party activists who attended
state conventions. Abramowitz, McGlennon, and Rapoport in Virginia, along
with colleagues in other states,2 surveyed local party activists who attended
state conventions held to select delegates to the national party conventions in
1980.
The findings of this research concerns participation,
incentives/motivations, group support. issues and ideology (Rapoport.
Abramowitz, and McGlennon (1986); Abramowitz and Stone (1984)). Balcer,
Hadler, Steed, and Moreland (1990), along with colleagues in other southern
states, surveyed local party activists who attended 1984 state conventions.
This research focused on themes common to the study of southern politics,
including party reform, partisan coalitions, and cultural change.
Southern Grassroots Party Activists Project
The Sou them Grassroots Party Activists Project is a collegial effort.4
directed by the authors and supported by a grant from the National Science
Foundation,5 to survey members of county political party organizations or
their equivalent in the states of the fonner Confederacy. The survey
instrument was developed from the scholarship previously cited and field
tested in Florida (d. Hulbary, Kelley, and Bowman (1989)) and South
Carolina a year or more in advance of the NSF grant application.
The immediate research goal is to describe contemporary party activism
and organization in a region undergoing significant political transition, and
where grassroots change in party organizations is likely to have an impact on
national politics. The project offers the possibility for analyzing the linkage
role of political parties at the grassroots and on a statewide and regional
basis. This research is expected to give insight into the relationship of
political parties to other linkage institutions such as campaign organizations
and interest groups. Also, the study should encourage replication over time
because of its broad data baseline. Hopefully, this study will have a catalytic
effect on systematic field research about political parties in other regions of
the country.

Preliminary Observations on Party Organizational Strength
Based on organizaJional complexity (accessible party headquarters, division
of labor, party budgets, and professional leadership) and programmaJic
capacity (institutional support activity and candidate-directed activity), Cotter,
Gibson, Bibby, and Huckshom (1984:28-30) found "generally that Democratic
state party organizations are substantially wealcer than their Republican
counterparts," a phenomenon that did not vary with region of the county. In
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fact, the weakest state Democratic parties among the southern states were
those of Mississippi, Louisiana, and Tennessee, while those of North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Texas were classified "moderately weak," and those
of Georgia, Virginia and Florida "moderately strong.'o6 Every Republican
party in the region, in contrast, was classified "moderately strong."
At the county level, in contrast, Republican parties were stronger than
their Democratic counterparts in seven of the eleven southern states, though
both political parties in six states7 were among the weakest in the country at
that level, regardless of the relationship to each other. (Cotter, Gibson,
Bibby, and Huckshorn (1984:52-53)).
In fact, the county Louisiana
Democratic parties ranked 50th, matching the rank of the county Georgia
Republican parties. Mayhew (1986:196), on the other hand, found Louisiana
political parties the strongest, followed by those in Arkansas, Georgia,
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia and Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North
Carolina and South Carolina.
Similar to Beck (1974), Hulbary, Kelley, and Bowman (1989:8-9) found
county Republican party organizational strength to coincide with affluent
county population growth, although the several Republican party organizations
were not as strong as their Democratic counterparts when measured by
organization "completeness,'' namely the extent to which the party had filled
the official positions in its local organizations. In the current NSF Project, the
county Democratic Party organizations appear organizationally stronger in all
the southern states except Georgia and Mississippi by this measure, while the
comparable Republican parties show comparable strength only in Florida,
Louisiana, South Carolina, and Texas (see Table 3.1).
Having relatively complete lists of county party organization members is
one thing, but their availability and datedness are something else again. For
example, the list of Louisiana Parish Democratic Executive Committee
members was very nearly two election cycles (seven years) old and
unavailable from the state party in contrast to the list readily computer
generated by the Louisiana Republican Party. Similarly, the list for the
Alabama Democratic Party was available from the party, but was one election
cycle (four years) out of date. Although a list was in the Florida Democratic
Party's computer data base, there was difficulty in retrieving it for use.
The Mississippi Republican Party not only lacked a list of its county party
organization members, it kept its list of county party chairs in a warehouse.
The Tennessee Republican Party only had an old outdated list of county party
chairs in direct contrast to its well organized Democratic counterpart. Neither
state political party in Georgia had lists of their county committee members
nor did the Virginia Republican Party of its county and city committee
members.
These problems in obtaining list of local party activists made it difficult
to reach the study's goal of a sample of 1000 activists per party for each state.
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Table 3.1 The Eictcnt of County-level Party Organization in the Southern States, 1991.
Alabama Arlcaosas
Democrats
Republicans

Florida

Gcorgiat Louisiana MissiMippi

Complete Complete Complete• Chairs
Chairs& Chairs% Complete Chairs
North
Carolina

Democrats Complete
Republicans Chairs

Complete#
Complete

Chairs
Chairs§

South
Carolina1

Tennessee

Texas

Virginia

Complete
Complete

Complete
Chairs

Complete
Complete

Complete
Chairs

Cell definitions: 'Complete,• a list of county level party members was available from the state
political party; "Chairs,• ollly a list of county chairs was available.
&
The Alabama Republican Party bas chairs in all 67 counties and lists of county
committee members were obtained from 46 county chairs. suggesting that they
arc not organized in the 21 rural counties where lists were not made available.
The Arkansas Republican Party has chairs in all 75 counties and lists of
county committee members were obtained from the 33 county chairs where
the party is known to be fairly well established.
•
The Florida Democratic Party bad difficulty retrieving its list of county
precinct committee members.
t
The Georgia Democratic Party bad county commillcc organizations in 140 of
159 counties, of which 58 provided membership lists. The Georgia Republican
Party bad commillccs in 102 counties, of which 24 provided membership lists.
The Louisiana Democratic Party bad no list of its parish Executive Committee
members. The Secretary of State had one that was one four-year election cycle
out of date. The Louisiana Republican Party kept a current and computer
accessible list.
§
The Mississippi Republican Party bad the list of its county committee
members stored in a warehouse. County commillce member lists for both
parties were one two-year election cyde out of date.
The South Carolina Republican and Democratic Parties have chairs in all 46
counties, but lists of county committee members for Republicans only were
only available in 36 for Republicans and 39 for Democrats, both of which
ill.dude the major metropolitan areas.

,

Table 3.2 describes the samples eventually drawn. The sample sizes confirm
the findings of Beck (1974) in that the two largest, fastest growing. and
electorally competitive states, Florida and Texas, have the most "complete"
county party organizations in terms of membership.
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Table 3.2 Number of County Level Party Organization Members Surveyed, 1991.

Alabama Arkansas

Dcmocrals
Republicans

993

l<Rl

1052

974

North
Carolina

Dcmocrals
Republicans

982
611

South
Carolina

929
954

Florida

Georgia

1096
1017

830
796

Tcnncsscc

Louisiana

Mississippi

605

1166

478

1204

Texas

878

1219

479

1220

1095
383

Legend: The numbers in italics arc the universe of complete party county (parish) committee
membership. The numbers in bold arc dose to being the universe, especially for
Soulh Carolina Republicans.
For Alabama the Dcmocrals and Republicans arc samples or 1 in 2 and 2 in 3; Florida
respectively 2 in 13 and 2 in 11; Mississippi, and Tennessee Democrats 1 in 2,
ArkaDSU 3 in 4; Saudi Carolina respectively 3 in 4 and 9 in 10, and Taas 1 in 5 and
1 in 3; North Carolina Democrats include all or the county chairs and 1 in 2 precinct
chairs. For Georgia, the Dcmocrals arc a universe from responding county chairs,
representing 2 in 5 county committee members. 1be number oC Republicans, on the
other hand, is the universe of county committee members reported by the Georgia
Republican Party. For VIIJlnla, the Democrats, though a universe, actually represent
2 in 3 county committee members due to the age of the list supplied by the state party.
On the other hand, the number of Virginia Republicans is based on the list or names
supplied by cooperative county/city chairs; therefore, making it nearly imp0M1blc lo
determine the total county/city party membership. For Nerlh Carollu the
Republicans include all of the chairs and vice chairs and some or the precinct chairs.

Unsolicited Comments On Party Involvement and Organization
Arkansas. Diane D. Blair (1991:7-8) found a number of county
Democratic and Republican Party members who insisted they had never held
a county party position, let alone knew what the county committee was, and
requested her assistance in removing their name from the list from which she
was working. Others who held county party positions were less than devoted
to their party. For example, a Republican respondent noted that "Most
Republicans are trying to promote themselves, rather than the party
and its policy," while a Democrat volunteered that his town would be more
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Democratic "if the one in charge would not flip flop and play golf so much
and take care of election business."

Louisiana. According to a St. Landry Parish Democratic Executive
Committee member "Most of the committee members who were active during
the last election were those running for public office." The member focused
extended commentary on the lack of connection (continuity) between the
committee and the voters. In fact,
The individual candidales don't bother with the Parish Committee. They run their
own fund raising and campaign. Based on my conversations with committee members
and candidates, lhe rural parish committee is not effectively plugged inlo the election
to get the grassroots vole out. Very few people in the parish can tell you who their
committee member is.

Another Parish Democratic Executive Committee member commented on the
relationship between parish members and those elected to the Democratic
State Central Committee:
. • • State Committee [members) (d)oo't want thinkers involved in platforms or
campaigns. They want to keep people quiet and calm, blindly following lradition and
leadership.

Mississippi. According to Steve Shaffer, some Democratic County
Committee members did not think of themselves as party activists, and only
agreed to serve as poll watchers as a favor, or permitted their name to be
used in an election year as the committee officially certified the primruy
election results. Moreover, a few respondents indicated they were elected
without their knowledge or consent.

Tennessee. The following sage advice and observations were offered by
an appointed member of the Hawkins County Democratic Executive
Committee:
In January, I was asked to be President of Hawkins County Demoaat Women which
I happily accepted . . • I soon lcamcd that the Democrat Party of Hawkins County
was alive and well, but in need of energy so I dropped out of school to gel Demoaat
candidates elected •• •
During the Demoaal Primary, the County Chair called a meeting of lhe Executive
Committee to discuu contn'butions to countywide candidates all ofwhom were in very
close races. . . • There was not a quorum at the meeting. but we did decide to
distn'bute funds to the countywide candidalcs. I participated in that dec:ision (much
to my chagrin), but I had been doing the things that a co11nty chair should ha\'C been
doing and was not about to let those candidates lose due to funds sitting in the
treasury.
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Texas. According to Frank Feigert, many of the Texas respondents
commented that they were motivated by single issues rather than political
party, including a Republican County Chair who "voted for the man and not
the party." Such motivation is noted below:
Prior lo my involvement, my daughter held the office I now hold. We wanted to ~tp
it in the family. Twice I have been 0t1 the ballot and won.
While I'm sure some people use politics to better their business or own political
ambition, I do what I do because I'm concemed about tht low moral goals of this
country and because I enjoy doing something bcsidca writing letters that get nothing
more than a form letter acknowledgement. (A)nd while you cannot legislate morality,
I am tired of my tax money being used to pay for •So)l tv1" "free obomons• and so forth.
I think you get my drift.

Having grown up in a politically active Democratic family, including a
mother who was elected County Treasurer, the Hartley County Republican
Chair explained:
When I began to believe that the Democratic Party was not rcsp<>DSM: to the interests
of this part of the world, I began voting in the Republican Primary and working for
the party in various ways. To quote from an old gentleman of this community, •1 did
not leave the Democratic Party, it left me: This is the view of many people in this
part of Texas. They COlllinue lo think of themselves as Democrats, but rarely vote
that way.

She went on to explain how she came to chair the county party along with her
duties:
On my position as County Chairman, I am amused and am87.Cd that people actually
compete for the job. I took it by appointment because no one else would. My job

is mostly •clerk," finding election workers, kc:cping records, posting proper notices, etc.
It is one of public relations in that I feel that I should promote the party in a positive
manner. I believe that it will be harder to find people to do this work in the future
because each time that the election code is CMll~d, the job is apanded.

Preliminary Conclusions

From the evidence gathered to date, the states with the strongest party
organizations at the local or county level are Florida and Texas. The
Republican parties in the other states of the South have yet to translate their
organizational strength at the state level to the county level. Moreover,
participation on a county party committee appears to have an •electoral
connection," single issue motivation, and, in some cases, little interest in
serving. The county party organization itself may have little linkage to the
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state or national political party. These questions, among others, will be
explored with the data collected by the state research teams.

Notes
1. The local party literature is brought together by Crotty (1986:1-38).
2. The states included were Ari7.ona, Colorado, Iowa Maine, Missouri, North Dakota,
0klahoina, South Carolina, Tcus, Utah, and Virginia.
3. The states included arc Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and TCDS.
4. Researchers responsible for data collection in the rollowing states alphabetically nrc:
Alabama, Patrick R. Cotter; .Atlcansas, Diane D. Blair; Florida, Lewis Bowman, William E.
Hulbary and Anne E. Kelley; Georgia, Brad Lockerbie and John A. Oark; Louisiana, Charles
D. Hadley; Mississippi, David A. Breaux and Stephen D. Shaffer; North Carolina, Charles L.
Prysby; South Carolina, Laurence W. Moreland and Robert P. Steed; Tennessee, David M.
Brodsky; Taas, Frank B. Feigert; and Vi,ginia, John J. McGlennon.
S. NSF Grant No. SES-90C)l)846. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations
expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily rcOcct the views of the National
Science Foundation.
6. The Alabama Republican Party (moderately strong) and Arkansas Democratic Party
(moderately weak) were not matched with their counterparts.
7. Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia Mississippi, Texas, and Louisiana.
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The Importance of Local Party Organization for
Democratic Governance
Michael Margolis

There is so111ething almost quaint in these: days or big parties, big government,
and advertising agency politics about a political institution that conjures up
images or Boss Tweed, torchlight parades, and ward bcclcrs.-Frank Soraur
(1%0:34)

ff anything, traditional city and county party organizations have weakened
or become obsolete in the thirty odd years since Sorauf made the above
observation. At first blush, therefore, there is something almost quaint about
the political science profession's continued insistence that these local
organizations form the basis of a decentralized-albeit increasingly less soparty structure (Eldersveld 1964:9-10; 98-117; Gitelson et al 1984:76-97;
Keefe 1991:43-51; Sorauf and Beck 1988:72 ff and 483). Closer examination,
however, suggests that concern with the viability of local parties relates to a
broader concern with democratic theory. Indeed, it is bard to imagine
democratic governance in the United States in the absence of city or county
parties or the local political organizations that serve as their functional
equivalents.
The next section of this paper will elaborate upon the statements in the
previous paragraph. The third section will examine their implications for
conducting research on the roles of local political organizations in effecting
democratic governance. The final section will present tentative conclusions
and recommendations for research.
ii

The decline of local party organization over the course of the Twentieth
Century is well known. Some powerful city and county parties still survive,
but civil service reforms and court decisions have eliminated most party
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patronage; structural reforms, such as city managers. commissions, direct
primaries and nonpartisan elections, have weakened organizational control
over elected officials; and shifts of population and businesses from central
cities to suburbs have undercut the political and economic clout of big city
governments. New technologies, such as targeted direct mail and mass
communications, have changed most aspects of fundraising and electoral
organization from labor intensive to capital intensive activities, and the
necessity of maintaining two income families has drained much of the pool of
volunteers that local parties once called upon (Ginsberg 1984; Kayden 1989;
Callow 1976).
Years of perceived economic growth and prosperity; decreasing numbers
in fanning, manufacturing, and mining;
expansions in professional,
managerial, and service sectors; rising levels of general education and
diminished proportions of European immigrants in the population have all
encouraged Americans to see themselves as members of the middle class.
The homogenization and consolidation of news media have helped to
reinforce the dominant cultural themes of liberal individualism and to
disparage political organizations associated with programs that distribute
benefits to the working and lower classes. Over the past thirty years,
Americans' loyalty to and identification with the Democratic and Republican
Parties has diminished, while popular approval of the parties as organizations
has remained generally low. Extraordinary majorities-over 90 percent in
Wisconsin-endorse the notion that voters should select the best candidate,
regardless of his or her party (Miller and Traugott 1989:79 ff., 171 ff; Keefe
1991: 10-15).
If decentralized labor intensive party organizations are outmoded,
ineffectual, and generally unpopular, why not simply bid them goodbye--or
perhaps even good riddance? We might note that they are gradually being
displaced at the local level by personal organizations of public officeholders
and that national party organizations and (to a lesser extent) state
organizations are gradually taking over their other functions, such as
fundraising, candidate training, and preparation of campaign strategies,
information, and advertising. Public office holders and candidates no longer
need local party workers as intermediaries between themselves and the
electorate: using modem media they can contact people directly. By what
better means than through direct communication can citizens judge their
merits?
In these days when the comings, goings, and doings of presidents,
governors, and mayors receive disproportionately large news coverage relative
to the work of legislators, we sometimes forget that the political science
literature is replete with warnings that unmediated communication between
mass electorates and political elites-especially political executives-can form
the basis of tyranny. Modem dictators from Hitler through Castro have made
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great efforts to assure that their messages alone fill the mass media.
Intermediate groups that might represent independent sources of political
information are forbidden;
only those that reinforce the dictators'
communications arc allowed (Kornhauser 1959; Martin and Chaudhary 1983).
In Western democracies, competitive political parties are ordinarily well-suited
for the task of offering the citizenry independent political information.
Moreover, because their messages seek to mobilize mass followings, political
parties can provide some balance against powerful political elites whose
messages tend to dominate the mass media and whose values tend to pervade
the political culture:
Political parties, with all their well-known hum1111 and structural shortcomings, arc the
only devices thus far invented by the wit or Western man that, with some effectiveness,
generate countervailing coUcctivc power on behalf' of the many individuaDy powerless
against the relatively rew wbo are individually or organa.ationally powerful Their
disappearance as active intermediaries, if not as preliminary sacening devices, would
only entail the unchallenged ascendancy of the already powerful, unless new structures
of collective power were somehow developed lo replace them, and unless coaditions
in America's social structure and political culture came to be such that they could be
effectively used (Burnham 1969:20).

At the tum of the century prominent political scientists supported
structural reforms designed to weaken the influence of local political parties,
but since at least mid-century the mainstream of the profession has favored
strengthening the parties and making them more responsible to the electorate
(Holli 1976; American Political Science Association 1950). The central ideas
of the "responsible parties" model of governance call for the party
organizations to nominate alternative slates of candidates representing distinct
political programs, for the parties' candidates to attempt to carry out those
programs if elected, and for the voters to hold the parties responsible for the
successes or failures of those programs. In the parlance of our discipline, the
party organization links the party-in-the-electorate with the party-ingovemment.
Without responsible parties, theorists suggest, elections frequently become
exercises in demagoguery, and, once elected, most legislators have insufficient
means of forging the coalitions necessary to carry forward their political
programs. An executive-centered politics results: a politics dominated by
presidents, governors, and mayors, who command media attention, and are
buttressed by public administrators, who ally with well-heeled groups of
clientele. (See Bachrach 1967; Ginsberg 1986; Lowi 1979; Parenti 1988;
Mills 1956).
While some scholars have argued that a responsible parties model is
inappropriate for American politics, and some have even questioned the
extent to which such a model functions successfully in parliamentary systems,
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few, if any, have suggested that democratic governance can be effected
through direct interaction between individual voters and state or national
political executives. (Epstein 1980; Herring 1965; Cronin 1989; Magleby
1984). Democratic governance is generally thought to begin at the local level.
Here citizens can organize themselves to press their demands for programs
and services and to elect representatives to carry out those demands. Here
too, the scale of government is often not overwhelming nor is the distance
remote; moreover, the cost of entering politics is less exorbitant. Potentially,
citizens can engage in a rich exchange of ideas about public policy, a process
that can even be enhanced by use of the new media technologies (Abramson
et al. 1988; Arterton 1987; Dahl 1970; Barber 1984; Margolis 1979).
Viable local parties can function to facilitate such exchanges. While some
have argued that other local organizations can also fulfill that function, the
weakening of local party organizations is a cause for concern. (Crotty 1986;
Lawson and Merkl 1988; Truman 1951; Thomas 1986; but see Gibson et al.
1985 and 1989 for evidence of organizational vitality.)

Ill
Notwithstanding the independent and central role of political parties in
democratic governance modem scholarship suggests that American political
parties can fruitfully be described as dependent variables, responsive to social
and political forces over which they have little control. Local parties, in
particular, have had little direct control over the development of media that
facilitate mobilization of voters with capital intensive campaigns, the
population movements that have shrunk central cities, the rise of federal and
state bureaucracies that administer entitlement and tax benefits, the extension
of civil service protection to most municipal employees, the expansion of
direct primaries, the diminution of European immigration, the expansion of
the white middle class, the structural changes in the American economy, or
the persistence of public aversion to the political parties and to government
programs aimed at the less fortunate. (Callow 1976; Keefe 1991:1; Sorauf and
Beck 1988:496-97).
While national and (to a lesser extent) state party organizations seem to
be adapting successfully to modem circumstances, the "boss" ruled city and
county organizations have virtually disappeared. That is not to say that local
party organizations no longer function. To the contraty, since the late 1970s
they seem to have revived somewhat. (Costikyan 1976). But with the possible
exception of the second coming of Mayor Daley to Chicago, there has been
little evidence of their resurrection as power centers in the party "stratarchy"
(Gibson ct al. 1985 and 1989).
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Moreover, local party organizations appear to have lost political clout.
How many citizens seeking help to deal with neighborhood or family
problems, or even to secure government services, now tum to their local party
committee member or precinct captain? Local party organizations generally
have neither the funds nor the followings to sway public officials. Their
influence over state and national party organizations is questionable; resources
now flow mostly from the top down. Often, local party organizations cannot
even control nominations within their own bailiwicks. Nor do they manage
to "aggregate" local interests very well, let alone to offer the voters alternative
party programs.
Nevertheless, local parties may still have something to offer candidates. By
law, they arc usually required to provide a captain or committee member for
every voting district, and their imprimaturs still resonate with many voters.
Llke aging madams of once proud bawdyhouscs, they sell their fading
establishments' services to anyone who pays the price of winning a primary
election.' Studies suggest that compared to the old-fashioned political
machine, the revived local organizations tend to be dominated by public
office-holders and peopled by activists drawn from higher occupational strata
than those of most patronage employees. Material motives have evolved from
securing patronage jobs to securing "honest graft" in the fonn of preferments
for contractors or licensees; lawyers and insurers find they can also make
useful business contacts; and those ambitious for public office can cultivate
potential supporters. For others, local party activity still provides an array of
solidary satisfactions, and for some it provides a means of working for
particular candidates or for general or specific policy outcomes. (Callow
1976; Margolis and Owen 1985; Sorauf and Beck 1988: 83-91, 102-13; Ware
1985).
Of course, the above remarks contain a good deal of conjecture. As Frank
Sorauf (1990) points out in a recent issue of Vox Pop, we lack sufficient data
on the thousands of local party organizations to make statistically confident
generalizations. To carry out a research agenda like the one he outlines to
fill the gaps in our knowledge, however, would (admittedly) require a
monumental collection of interviews, observations, and documents that would
dwarf any of our previous or current efforts. To contemplate such a large
undertaking raises the question of whether learning so much about local party
organizations is worth the price, especially if these organizations are becoming
weak and subservient.
This brings us back to consideration of the role that responsible local party
organizations are supposed to play in democratic governance. The
responsible parties model calls for local parties to engage in certain activities,
such as precinct organization, program development, candidate recruitment,
campaign management, and communication between the electorate and
government officials. One way of evaluating the applicability of the model,
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therefore, would be to mount studies designed to assess how effectively local
party organizations carry out these activities. Such assessments, however,
would seem to ignore the possibility that for reasons beyond their immediate
control, traditional local party organizations can no longer perform these
activities efficiently. That is, such assessments presume that local parties arc
independent rather than dependent variables.
If we decide to study democratic governance at the local level without
presuming that local party organizations arc the independent variables, then
our perspective changes. Instead of starting with the organization and
membership of local parties, we can begin by focusing on the processes that
democratic theorists suggest arc critical for effecting democratic governance.
For example, how do citizens find information about local policy concerns?
How do they make their demands or preferences known to local public
officials? By what organized means, if any, are citizens able to consider policy
alternatives? How are candidates recruited for local public office? How are
funds raised for electoral campaigns? How are the campaigns managed?
What arc the critical factors in determining electoral outcomes?
This perspective provides the advantage of focusing upon questions of
democratic governance that extend beyond the locality in which a study takes
place. It provides a broad theoretical framework for what might otherwise be
characterized as just another isolated case study. At the same time, it should
generate information on the performance of parties in the local political
environment Basically, it allows us to investigate who (or which groups) carry
out the functions putatively performed by traditional local party organizations.
If local parties still perform these functions, our investigation will show it At
the same time the investigation will disclose the extent to which other political
organizations, such as neighborhood, ethnic, or civic groups carry them out.
Finally, the investigation will show the extent to which wealthy individuals,
major employers, bureaucrats, media moguls, political executives, state or
national party organizations perform these critical functions.

iv
In contrast to the general electorate, political scientists display an unusual
degree of affection for the American political parties. Our textbooks still

describe the parties as decentralized organizations with widely dispersed
powers. Notwithstanding mounting evidence of the declining prowess of local
party organizations, they still characterize local parties as powerful elements
in a rather disorderly general party organization that is "stratarchical" rather
than hierarchical (Gitelson et at. 1984:76-77; Keefe 1991:43-49; Sorauf and
Beck 1988:128-30). This essay has argued that far from being quaintly
nostalgic, the special concern shown for local party organizations relates to
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broader concerns of democratic theory. Without parties or their functional
equivalents to organize and empower the masses, wealthy elites who dominate
the social and economic order find little to prevent them from also
dominating the governmenL
Nonetheless, political, social, and economic changes throughout the
Twentieth Century have buffeted American political parties and gradually
made the traditional local party organization outmoded. National and state
party organizations appear to have adjusted to the changes more easily than
local party organizations, and as consequence, their influence has increased
relative to that of local parties. Scholars disagree, however, over the extent
to which local party organizations still manage to function responsibly and
effectively. Much of the disagreement stems from the fact that we lack
sufficient data to generalize with confidence about the thousands of local
party organizations in the United States. Yet the cost of collecting sufficient
data to resolve the disagreement is daunting, and we have no assurance that
knowing more about local parties will be worth the price, particularly if these
organizations tum out to be weak and ineffectual.
The research strategy suggested, therefore, focuses upon the functions that
democratic theorists have ascribed to responsible local party organizations
rather than upon the organizations per se. By treating party as just one of
many local variables, this strategy encourages examination of alternative
models of local democratic governance in which organizations other than local
political parties are critical. At the same time, it does not prevent us from
recognizing when active and effective local party organizations perform the
functions in question or when less democratic elites are in control. Finally,
because it proceeds from a broad theoretical framework into which scholars
can fit case studies, the strategy might encourage more party scholars to
devote their energies to the study of local politics.

Notes
1. How often do party organiz.ations publicly repudiate a candidate before or after a
primary? Even the nomination ofl..aRouchitcs to the Democratic ticket in Illinois or a recently
retired leader of the Klu Klux Klan lo the Republican ticket in Louisiana were apparantly not
enough to stir party officials. It was Stevenson, not party officials, who refused to tolerate a
ticket that tied the party to the LaRouchites. While the Republican National Party has officially
disowned David Duke, I am unaware of any concerted effort by Louisiana Republican Party
officials or organi7.Btions to repudiate him.
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Questions Raised by Recent Attempts at

Local Party Reform
Kay Lawson

It is appropriate that my presentation be the last because what I have to
say reflects my experiences in practical politics. For although I am here as a
member of the "Scholarly Perspectives" panel and am indeed a party scholar,
the questions I want to raise are those that have presented themselves to me
as an active member of a reform organization.1
The Northern California Committee for Party Renewal is a state branch
of the National Committee for Party Renewal. It was formed in 1980 with the
goal of strengthening political parties in California as participatory and
purposeful intermediaries (of the citizens of that state). Although many of its
members are party scholars, and draw upon their professional knowledge of
parties to aid the Committee, the Committee is designed as an active reform
group and does not itself produce works of scholarship. At the same time,
however, the scholar-members (and other interested scholars) are welcome to
draw upon the work of the Committee for purposes of scholarly inquiry.
When we do so, as in present paper, it is clear that the Committee's work
raises many interesting questions for the study of local party organizations.
The four I will explore here are the following: First, whatis. "the local party"the state organization or the county organization? Second, how and when do
goals of these two levels differ? Third, when they do differ, what methods can
and does each employ to accomplish its ends? Fourth, what role can multipartisan academic reform groups play in strengthening grassroots party
democracy?
The Northern California Committee for Party Renewal tends to view
parties from what I have elsewhere termed a linkage prospective: we believe
that parties are the only organizations capable of linking citizens to the state
by selecting officials accountable to substantive but changeable programs that
have been formulated by party members and approved by a majority of the
electorate. We distinguish between the organizational and the public
functions of parties: we believe that although parties themselves may seek
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only to win elections and obtain power, it is the responsibility of the public,
i.e., of the citizens in a democracy, to insist that their parties also perform the
function of linkage. We believe that no other institution can take the place
of parties as agencies of linkage: campaigns and elections have been turned
into spectator sports by entertainment-minded media; individual elected
officials, however well-intentioned, lack the organized support of like-minded
men and women necessary to turn promise into policy; single-issue interest
groups lack the equally necessary breadth of representativeness; and even the
most well-meaning bureaucrats inevitably lose sight of a larger and possibly
changing public interest, limited as they are by the language of statutes
already on the books.
Finally, we believe that it is obvious that democratic linkage must begin
at the base and cannot be imposed from above by national party leaders who
believe they know best the interests of those they would have as followers.
Such leaders can offer realistic advice and substantive help regarding how to
win elections--without which effective linkage is of course impossible--and can
help shape grassroots interests into winning programs. But in a democracy
every citizen is entitled to access to an arena in which a broad range of
interests are articulated and the process of interest aggregation is begun.
That means strong local parties.
So much for our rhetoric. What about our acts? Our job, seeking to
strengthen local parties as agencies of linkage, is especially difficult in
California. The Progressive reforms of 1910-1912 prohibited parties from
participating in city and county elections, established directly elected but all
but powerless county committees, placed the control of the state parties in the
hands of their legislative leaders, and, by establishing the direct primary, took
away the parties' right to choose their own candidates. The legislators used
their power to keep the parties as weak as possible. By 1980 California's
parties were no longer able even to issue endorsements or offer opposition
in primary or local elections and were told, by law, where to hold their state
conventions, when to hold them, and who might attend. Party organization
below the level of the county was limited to "clubs" (Democratic) or
"assemblies" (Republican); both were legally unofficial and neither was
permitted to elect representatives to higher party bodies. As the committee
began its work, California's parties were so weak as to be virtually
nonexistent, particularly at the local level.
The Committee realized it was impossible to strengthen California's
parties so long as the legislators' debilitating control was so strongly enforced
by law. It made no sense to ask those who profited from the status quo to
change it, so we did not take our case to Sacramento: we took it to court.
We sued the state of California for excessive and unconstitutional regulation
of the parties. Our case, which came to be know as March Fong Eu v. San
Francisco County Democrals, argued that state law violated the First
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Amendment in three respects: first, in denying the right to endorse in
primary elections; second, in denying parties the right to endorse in
nonpartisan elections, and third, in imposing on the parties a number of rules
and regulations regarding their conduct of their internal affairs (specifically,
the selection requirements for State Central Committee members, the
stipulation that State Chairs could serve only two year terms and must be
chosen alternately in the northern and southern halves of the state; the
detennination of the time and place of party meetings, and the limits set for
party dues).
Because the Committee itself lacked adequate legal "standing," one of its
first tasks was to find appropriate co-litigants, i.e., party members and units
directly affected by the offending laws. It was at this point that the distinction
between different levels of "local" parties became clear to us: controlled as
they were by legislators (whose exercise of power would be limited by stronger
parties holding them accountable), the State Central Committees of the major
parties refused to join the suit. (Years later, when victory was clearly close
at hand, the Democratic State Central Committee did join the action). Local
Democratic County Committees, however, signed on with amazing alacrity:
within a month the San Francisco, Alameda, Santa Clara and Los Angeles
County Committees were all co-litigants. The Republicans proved much more
cohesive on the matter: it was very difficult to find a Republican County
Committee willing to challenge its state leadership, and it was only after
several weeks of internal contention that the San Francisco Republicans broke
ranks with the state party and joined the suit. The Libertarian Party was the
most cohesive: from the beginning, its statewide organization was one of the
strongest and earliest supporters of the suit, with full backing from its local
units.
The suit was filed in the fall of 1983 and victory was won in the United
States Supreme Court in the spring of 1988. The reasons for the long delay,
and the ups and downs of hearings at one level of the court system after
another have been recounted elsewhere.2 All that need be mentioned here
is that owing to various legal technicalities, by the time the case reached the
highest court, one of the three counts, the denial of the right of parties to
endorse in nonpartisan races, had been dropped.3 But the Court ruled
unanimously that the State of California had failed to show how banning or
opposing party endorsements of primary candidates served the interest of a
stable political system nor how it could "justify regulating a party's internal
affairs without showing that such regulation is necessary to ensure an election
that is orderly and fair.'t4
What is interesting for our purposes here is what happened next, and how
these developments illustrate the importance of distinguishing clearly between
levels of "local" party, recognizing when the goals of these two levels differ,
and identifying the methods each level may employ to accomplish its ends.
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To begin with, the state Republicans, consistent with their earlier refusal
to have anything to do with the case, have refused to employ their new right
to endorse in primary elections. This is their right, of course, but they have
not stopped there. They have also ruled that their county committees may not
issue endorsements, and when the Santa Clara County Republicans defied this
ban, the state Republicans response was to ask the California legislature to
add a clause to the California Electoral Code stating that the Republican
State Central Committee could prohibit or limit the power of county central
committees to endorse and that the Superior Court could issue restraining
orders or injunctions prohibiting such endorsement The bill passed, aided by
the votes of several Democrats, and although patently contrary to the Eu
ruling became law without the Governor's signature as of October 1, 1988.5
The Democrats, on the other hand, took up the challenge and decided to
issue endorsements. However, the procedure they have established is
cumbersome (one-fourth of the party's forty page by-laws is now devoted to
explaining it), and heavily weighted in favor of maintaining centralized control
over the process. In order to be endorsed, incumbents need only a simple
majority, but non-incumbents must gain 60 percent of the vote of caucus
members present and voting at endorsement caucuses meeting during an
"endorsing convention" of the Democratic State Central Committee.6 All
endorsement decisions must be ratified by a majority of the present and voting
members of the Democratic State Central Committee except those for
statewide office (in which case the endorsing caucus is composed of all
members anyway). The Central Committee can decide to endorse a substitute
candidate, from among those earlier considered for endorsement by the
relevant endorsing caucus, once an earlier endorsement has been "vacated" by
nonratification, although such a substitute candidate must receive at least 75
percent of the vote. After the primary, all winners are deemed to be the
endorsed candidates of the party (whether or not previously endorsed) unless
75 percent of the members of the Executive Board object.
In addition to creating endorsement rules that favor incumbents and the
party leadership, the Democrats also established clear limits on endorsement
activities by lower party units. If a County Central Committee wants to give
an independent endorsement to a candidate for statewide partisan public
office it must ask the Executive Board of the State Central Committee for a
"variance," and even if that request is granted, the locally-endorsed candidate
must still go through the regular state endorsement process. Endorsements
for candidates for County Central Committees are not allowed. Any unit of
the party which gives "an independent, unauthorized" endorsement forfeits its
right to representation on the Central Committee "and the privileges and
benefits which may be attached thereto for a period of 12 months from the
time it renders such an endorsement, or the remainder of the term of the
current State Central Committee, whichever is longer."
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The party does aJtow "pre-endorsing conferences" at the regional level.
Any candidate gaining 70 percent or more of the votes at such a meeting may
have his or her name placed on the "consent calendar" of the Central
Committee's endorsing convention, and this calendar is approved by a simple
majority vote. However, a name may be removed from the consent calendar
by any five members of the Central Committee who reside in the district in
question and who file a letter of objection with the State Chair up to ten days
prior to the State Endorsing Convention.7
As one would expect, the net result of such regulations has been massive
re-endorsement of incumbents. In 1988 only one of the Democratic
incumbents running for Congress or state legislative office failed to gain
endorsements, and that candidate nevertheless won the primary and the
general election. In the 1990 gubernatorial race, when the party had no
incumbent in office, the candidate it endorsed (by a margin of two votes) lost
in the primary vote nevertheless, and the winner, fonner San Francisco Mayor
Dianne Feinstein, went on to Jose the general election.
These responses by the major parties also say something about the ability
of multi-partisan academic reform groups to strengthen grassroots party
democracy. So far, the hoped for democratization of the parties has been
only slightly advanced by the endorsement provisions of the Eu decision. The
major parties have either refused to endorse altogether, or kept the process
securely under centralized control, and neither endorsing nor denying
endorsement has yet been shown to have a significant effect on the outcome
of elections. Yet the process does appear to be underway: maverick
Republican County Committees are continuing to fight for endorsement
rights; and Democratic Endorsement Conventions are well attended and
publicized. Grassroots party activists do have a new arena for seeking greater
power within their parties, and some of them are using it.
Similar answers to our four questions can be found in the parties'
response to winning the right to set their own rules and regulations. Here too
the State Central Committees have seen to it that only minor changes have
been made (e.g., the Democrats immediately changed the term of the State
Party Chair from two to four years and eliminated the proviso that the
chairmanship must alternate between northern and southern California). And
the parties' legislators have written new legislation regulating the parties in
a detailed (not to say nit-picking) fashion which appears to be clearly contrary
to the Eu decision.8
The legislators (who continue to control the parties' State Central
Committees) have also used extravagantly dilatory tactics to delay the removal
of even those clauses in the California Elections Code that were specifically
named as unconstitutional by the Eu decision. Even after the victors in the
lawsuit "entered into stipulation," a legal process seeking an order to enforce
a judicial decision, and won an order invalidating (again!) all such sections of
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the Code, the provisions remained in the Code, and continued to be enforced

by county clerks and elections officials who were apparently unaware of either
the decision or the stipulation. In 1990, a bill was introduced to eliminate all
sections of the Code relating to the Republican and Democratic Parties that
had been specifically inva1idated by the Eu decision, plus additional sections
that made no sense without those already invalidated. The Republicans in the
legislature, embroiled in their internal battles over the matter of endorsement,
decided to take no part in this legislation. The bill passed nevertheless in the
Assembly, but when it reached the State Senate questions were raised about
the need to eliminate similar laws regulating the Peace and Freedom,
Libertarian, and American Independent Party as well. Rather than address
that matter, the Senate gutted the bill by amendment: in its final version the
law simply required the State Central Committee of the Democratic Party to
convene in Sacramento after a general election in March rather than between
January and Marchl9
If victory at the level of the U.S. Supreme Court is so slow in producing
effective change, are other means open to would-be reformers? The
Committee put the matter to the test in spring 1991, seeking to rally support
for a change in California's method of delegate selection. Backed by former
Governor Jerry Brown (for reasons undoubtedly his own), the Committee
recommended to the Democratic Party (assuming the Republican Party would
be forced to follow suit) that it select its convention delegates by a mixed
system, half primary and half caucus. Telephone interviews with party leaders
in caucus states convinced Committee members that when properly organized,
the caucus system is more democratic than media-manipulated primaries and
is an effective way of building strong local parties. The idea also appealed to
many in the party who had no particular interest in these goals, simply
because caucus delegates could be chosen in March. California law,
seemingly unchangeable at least for the immediate future, mandates that the
primary be held in June, which means that the nation's largest state usually
has no influence whatsoever on the national outcome. Changing to the mixed
system would give California the voice it now lacks.
However, although the new idea won considerable grassroots support,
particularly in Northern California, and a resolution proposing that a plan for
such a system be formulated and given serious consideration passed at the
Democratic Party's 1991 statewide convention, all the cards proved to be on
the other side. It soon became clear that most of the state party leaders
(including Jerry Brown's successor as chair, Phil Angelides) had no interest
in a system which might change present power arrangements within the party.
The Ad Hoc Delegates Selection Committee appointed by Angelides to carry
out the convention resolution was clearly stacked against the move, and local
party leaders who came to testify at its hearing did not rush to the rescue;
most of them, especialiy in Southern California, said unashamedly that
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whatever its advantages it simply sounded like too much work for them. The
Committee's two to one recommendation against shifting to a mixed system
was adopted by voice vote at the June 1991 meeting of the party's Executive
Board.
The Committee's work seeking to strengthen local parties in California
has not given definitive answers to the questions raised in this paper. Our
work does, however, make clear that state and county levels of our parties
may differ significantly and should not be considered indiscriminately as the
"local" party. Furthermore, it suggests an interesting range of tactics that
strongly centralized state party organizations can employ when grassroots
activists, aided and abetted by multi.partisan reform groups, threaten to
challenge their control. And it hints at the likely effectiveness of the various
tactics the latter may seek to employ. Although such has never been more
than a secondary objective of the Committee, its work is raising new questions
for the scholarly study of parties, whatever it may eventually accomplish
regarding its more purposive ends.
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9. Thus amended, the bill, Assembly Bill 4118, passed in the Assembly, was signed by the
governor, and became law as of September 21, 1990. At prc:sc:nt writing it appears California
will at last put its electoral Code in accord with the ruling of the Court. In 1991 a bill
(Assembly Bill 177) was introduced to repeal all laws specifying the times and places for
convening state Democratic, Republican, and Peace and Frc:c:dom central committees as well
as those parts of the electoral Code requiring county central committcc:s to meet in county
courthouses at a specified date or at the call of the county cleric. Assembly Bill rn is expected
to pass.
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Comments by Practitioners
Michael Margolis (Workshop °'8anizer):
The title of the workshop summarizes some of the issues we are discussing
this afternoon. In our first session, we had a distinguished panel of political
scientists actively researching parties, and in our second session, we have a
panel of practitioners with great and varied experience with political parties.
Members of the second panel have read the papers by the members of the
first panel and can respond to their remarks if they wish. We will hear from
John Pitney, Former Research Director, Republican National Committee and
Assistant Professor, Claremont McKenna College; Lynn Cutler, Vice Chair,
Democratic National Committee; Mark Strand, Administrative Assistant,
Congressman Bill Lowery; Les Frances, Executive Director, Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee; and Tom Cole, Executive Director,
National Republican Campaign Committee.
John Pitney (Former Research Director, Republican National Committee and
Assistant Professor, Claremont McKenna College):

I am here as a "hackademic." I probably could have served on either panel
because I have been both a practitioner and a political scientist. Until a few
weeks ago I was with the Republican National Committee, serving as Director
of Research, and now I am back, teaching government at Claremont
McKenna College.
A good place to start is by clearing up a common misconception: that the
Republican National Committee has a strong policy orientation. Many people
think that the RNC puts out position papers and indoctrinates candidates into
party ideology and so forth. In fact, it does surprisingly little in this regard.
During my time at RNC, the Research Department devoted most of its
attention to providing speakers with political information and to helping the
press secretary prepare party officials for media interviews. To the limited
extent that we did produce material for outside usage, our work hewed closely
to White House statements, with very little "value added." There was more
public activity in the mid-1980s, as Paul Herrnson's excellent paper points out.
At that time, there was a peak in staffing at the RNC, and it did a lot of
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candidate training, including the preparation of issue books. But these issue
books were very carefully hedged, and there was no real "indoctrination" of
candidates. Some policy material used to appear in First Monday, a quarterly
magazine published by the RNC. But First Monday stopped publication last
fall, just as RNC's quasi-academic jouma~ Commonsense, perished several
years earlier.
So why should political scientists be interested in RNC? The answer is
that this organization supplies a good case study of the bureaucratization of
politics. Herc I use the term bureaucracy in the everyday sense of red tape,
but also in its analytic sense, as in Anthony Down's definition: a large
organization of full-time workers whose output is not directly evaluated by the
market. These two meanings are related, of course, and James Q. Wilson's
Bureaucracy helps explain why this is the case. Although Wilson does not
mention the Republican National Committee, his book sheds light on its
operations.
First, consider "bureaucracy" in its everyday meaning. I came across the
following quotation in a profile of David Carmen, a Washington lobbyist who
worked at the RNC several years ago, and it captures the organization fairly
well.
Tbc RNC turned out to be everything that Carmen had reared-a huge depersonalized

maze • • . Ideas, David learned, often rose or rell on the names oC the people
suggesting them. Whose idea was that? He would joke, we'll decide if it is good after
we know whose idea it was • • • For all the petty mancuw:riag. it seemed lo young
Carmen- brash, coafidencc, impatient-that nothing ever happened at RNC, that ideas
floated around for months, and then disappeared into the ether.

His experience is not unusual. Nearly every RNC veteran I have ever known
has voiced similar frustrations and although much of the griping is directed
at individuals, the problem is not one of personalities. Rather, the difficulty
lies in the organization's mission and character. This is where the academic
literature can be helpful.
Wilson classifies bureaucracies by the measurability of their outputs, their
day-to-day work, and their outcomes, their impact on the real world. In this
sense, the RNC resembles OSHA (I doubt that you have heard this
comparison before). Both are examples of what Wilson calls "procedural
organizations," whose outputs are tangible, but whose outcomes are
mysterious. Consider the specific case of the RNC. The measurable outputs
include: the money it spends, the pamphlets it issues, and the advice it gives.
But the outcome-helping the Republican Party-is very difficult to measure.
What difference does RNC make? The RNC spends a lot of money, but
when it spreads that money across 50 states and 3,042 counties, the impact in
any locality is necessarily limited. Did a particular pamphlet change anybody's
mind? Those of you who study elections know how hard it is to measure the
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impact of communication on voters. Did assistance to a particular candidate
tip the results to that election? RNC advises campaigns, but does not have
formal and final responsibility for any campaign, anytime, anywhere.
There is one exception to this rule: you seldom know when you have
succeeded, but you always know when you have erred badly. The most
famous example is the "Foley memo" from June 1989. Mark Goodin, then the
RNC Communications Director, had probably done a terrific job up to that
point, but how could one measure the good he achieved? He put out
perceptive memos and pointed press releases. but what impact did they have
on the electorate? How many votes did they win for the Republican Party?
Perhaps a great deal, but no one knows for certain. But what is clear is that
the "Foley memo" made questionable insinuations about the Speaker of the
House and hurt the GOP badly. Mark took responsibility for it and had to
resign. Again, RNC's problems stem not from bad people-there are many
good people at RNC-but from organizational constraints. In a procedural
organization, managers focus on means rather than ends, and become risk
averse. Since one cannot measure the outcomes, one measures the outputs.
So people spend a lot of time going over paperwork and generating red tape
to the point that it irritates everyone.
Students of public policy have concluded that more outputs in Washington
(e.g., more spending) do not necessarily yield greater outcomes in the field.
Yet some observers have concluded that because the RNC employs more
people and spends more money than the DNC. it is having a greater political
impact, that the RNC's edge in spending outputs supposedly generates an
edge in electoral outcomes. But consider the concept of opportunity cost:
every dollar that goes into the Washington party organizations is a dollar that
is not available to candidates and party groups at the grassroots-where the
GOP needs the most help. Yes, the national party organizations do funnel
aid to the grassroots, but as students of fiscal federalism can attest, resources
are always lost along the way.
Republicans have started to recognize the problem. Last fall there was a
fairly substantial staff cutback at the RNC. Although it will not return to the
skeletal levels of the early 1970s, neither will it reach the gargantuan level of
the mid-1980s. This is not necessarily a bad thing for the Republican Party.
Ed Rollins gave a speech this year in which he said "The way we run our
party has been exactly opposite to our philosophy of government. We
Republicans praise decentralization and damn bureaucracy, but we have had
centralization and bureaucracy in our national party committees." Thus, there
is more emphasis these days on moving away from the big national committee
model.
Where does this leave political scientists? A useful way to study parties
would be to compare them to other kinds of organizations and apply analytic
tools developed by students of bureaucracy and public policy. Those of us in
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the Political Organizations and Parties Section can learn a great deal from
those in the sections on Public Policy and Public Administration.
Lynn Cutler (Jlice Chair, Democratic National Committee):

First, let me say that I am new to this panel, replacing my colleague, Kathy
Vick, who was unable to attend. I have always respected and worked with
political scientists, but I cannot imagine what you are doing in Washington
DC in August I know you are the only conference here this entire month
because I could get a parking space in the hotel this morning. This fact either
reveals your scholarly commitment or that your travel budgets have been so
severely cut that you can't come during the academic year.
I served in county government in Iowa for eight years and ran for Congress
twice, but basically I have been a party person, political junkie, all of my life,
and I have a very deep belief in the importance of state and local party
organizations. My current portfolio at the Democratic National Committee
is essentially working with state and local elected officials. I am always
surprised to read from time to time that local parties are in deep trouble,
almost a vanishing breed. My telephone call list belies that image because
local party officials are certainly calling me, letting me know what is going
on, and how I can help them.
At the DNC we have been organizing state elected officials for the last two
years. The numbers in Paul Herrnson•s paper really tell the story. If you
were to look at the amount of money we expended in 1990 on the
coordinated campaign, it's the first time in history we exceeded the
Republicans on anything. It's only by a little over $200, but nonetheless, it
represents progress. I'm in my third term as Vice Chair of the Party. Nobody
has ever done this before; I keep saying I'm going to do it till we get it right.
Because of my long tenure, I have a feel for what has evolved at the DNC
over the last eleven years. Ordinarily, there is no history because the staff
leaves after a change in the chairmanship. I suspect that's not true at the
RNC because they've had the White House for so long and essentially have
had the same crew running things.
We do not suffer from the bureaucracy problem Jack Pitney described; we
have at maximum one hundred ten or twenty employees. And number is only
that large because we recently beefed up our research division. We do issue
papers and we do them frequently. The Chairman makes statements on
relevant issues all of the time and we are happy to share those with the
public, calling them wnte Party lines." They come out on a regular basis on
issues or events.
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I was first elected to my position in February 1981 when Charles Manatt
became chainnan. It was a little like taking over the Titanic after it had sunk.
I remember going over to the Democratic National Committee offices after
the 1980 election and thinking "Oh God, what have I done?" There was
literally broken furniture on the floor; it looked like the fall of Saigon.
Everybody had left the DNC to work on the presidential campaign. So we
started at a very ]ow point and it was very difficult. Chuck Manatt had been
a major fundraiscr for the party and a state party chair in California. He used
his strong organizational and fundraising skills to rebuild the party in a very
innovative way. For example, in 1982, in the middle of my first tenn, we did
the first coordinated campaign effort in the state of New Mexico, which was
called "State Party Works." We went to all of the players, our Senate
candidate, the state party, and some of the larger county parties, and said "We
feel there's a great deal to be gained by working together, and pooling our
polling, staff, and get-out-the-voter efforts." These are things the Republicans
knew a long time ago, and most of us knew intellectually, but found very hard
to do in practice. Having been a congressional candidate, I can assure you
that when they say "Well, the Senator's workers are going to go in and drive
out all the vote in that precinct" and I know that's not my vote, it's a little
hard to say "Oh sure, go ahead." It's a very delicate weaving together of
people working towards similar ends.
The concept "State Party Works" later evolved under Paul Kirk to a larger
program where we tried to get many of the states involved, although the 1984
presidential campaign essentially ignored it The whole concept has continued
to build until what we have now is called the "Coordinated Campaign." Our
current chainnan, Ron Brown, has a very deep commitment to it. You can
see this from the dollars we sent to the states that were engaged in
coordinated campaigns in 1990. As you all know, the main driving forces
were all the gubernatorial races, along with the House and Senate elections.
Now, none of this would work if it weren't for an extraordinary and new
weaving together of the three national committees. We have all been in one
building since late 1984, and back in 1987 we started a regular series of
meetings between the key political staff to pool our resources, energies, and
talents. I think that our success rate at the state and local level is very much
due to these efforts.
Now you can criticize the number of staff involved and say it's a problem.
And it is a problem, particularly when we look at the list of things that we
would like to be doing and we don't have the staff for. As a result, my office
not only does state and local parties, but I'm the official liaison out to the
Jewish community, which I'm happy to do, women's community, which is a
mixed blessing, and now we've taken on the disabilities community, which is
a large and growing force in national politics.
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Our party structure is very different from the Republicans Jack Pitney
described. Our state and local parties arc very autonomous and we have little
bureaucracy. We are very decentralized and we have a big turnover in state
chairs. One year there was a 75 percent turnover. This makes the job even
tougher. We have worked very closely with our state parties to get them up
to speed on new technology, the Coordinated Campaign, our regional training
program, and our efforts to get county and municipal parties committees
involved. My office plays a big role in doing the outreach to the local officials
and their campaign workers.
Because of the lateness of the 1992 presidential cycle, we've been able to
do wonderful things in advance of the fall campaign. The truth is that without
the presidential candidates in the mix, there is a great deal of planning that
can go forward. Under Paul Tulley, our political director, we've had meetings
with all our potential presidential candidates and everybody signed on to the
program. This means that we will start a presidential campaign well in
advance of our national convention, a unique experience for Democrats. We
know that our colleagues on the other side of the aisle were doing research
on the Willy Horton ads months before their national convention in 1988.
We have never done polling this early before now, and we are continuing to
build on that baseline poll, so that for the first time the strength of the
national party is recognized.
Part of this revolves around the personality and ability of the Chairman to
pull people together. Ron Brown is really quite extraordinary in that regard.
It's helped with our fundraising, which is going very well. There are lots of
things the national party could do that the DNC never did before. We can
do advance schools in the spring and we can order an airplane-things that
historically our presidential campaigns haven't begun to think about until the
day after the convention. Chairman Brown has forced that whole discussion
up front, and absent the parochial interests of the declared candidates, we've
been able to move very far along. Regardless of who becomes our party's
nominee, we will be in far better shape than ever before for the fall campaign.

Mark Strand (Administrative Assistant, Congressman Bill Lowery):

rn be talking from the perspective of Virginia politics. I originally came
from the Long Island Republican politics, but lately I've been active in
Virginia politics, serving as a member of the Fairfax and Prince William
County Republican Committees, an elected member of the Virginia State
Central Committee, an administrative assistant with Stan Parris of Virginia
until his involuntary retirement, and currently I'm an administrative assistant
with Bill Lowery of California. So, I can talk a little bit about the failures and
successes of local party politics. I'm not a political scientist. I can blame you
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guys for everything I learned in college. I'll just talk from a practical point of
view.
I think that the organizational strengths of local political parties have
become a very significant variable in election outcomes. If you look at close
elections, the relative strength or weakness of a local party organization
makes a huge difference. I know all the experts talk about how national
parties have become stronger, the media have become a stronger influence,
direct mail bas become important. and so forth. But I maintain that a wellorganized local party will compensate for a lack of money and other
resources.
In Virginia, the late 1970s and early 1980s saw a great influx of new
Republicans at the local level. Republicans who were, quite frankly, former
Democrats, and who were strong workers and ideologically motivated. These
people greatly increased the strength of the local parties. After a while some
of their fervor started to fade. Then a lot of the traditional Republicans
started to reassert control of the parties and a period of intra-party warfare
ensued. Within the Virginia Republican Party, as in other parts of the
country, more moderate factions fought more conservative factions. I
wouldn't be surprised if that was true for the Democrats as well, but from the
reverse ideological perspective.
This infighting left the Republican Virginia Party decimated. In 1980, the
Virginia Republicans controlled one Senate seat. the governorship, and nineout-of-ten congressional seats, and then picked up the other Senate seat in
1982. But right now, the Virginia GOP has lost three gubernatorial elections
in a row, holds only one Senate seat, and only four-out-of-ten congressional
seats. I maintain this turnabout had a lot to do with the decline of local party
organizations. After all, this is a state where George Bush got 60 percent of
the vote in 1988, Ronald Reagan got 62 percent in 1984, and Reagan defeated
Carter by 15 percent in 1980. This is a state with a solid Republican tradition
and a strong conservative philosophy, but these have not been translated into
a practical majority.
What happened to the local party organizations is that they became
candidate organizations. For instance, in northern Virginia, there was
Congressman Frank Wolrs campaign organization and Congressman Stan
Parris' organization. These two gentlemen operated the only real political
organization in northern Virginia. Meanwhile the county organizations and
the city organizations collapsed and became very ineffective. We created a
situation where the candidates did not trust the party to provide even poll
workers or people to drop literature. They had to have their own people and
to get those people they went directly to party members, bypassing the party
leadership. Virginia Republicans had never had a traditional patronage
system like Republicans in New York or Democrats in Chicago, so the strong
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parties of the early 1980s collapsed fairly quickly. These declines resulted in
some significant losses at the polls.
So how do you pick up the pieces? Local parties are not without some
important resources. Money and the things money buys are not among them.
Local political organizations tend to contribute very little money to candidates
because they don't usually have much money. They are not connected with
PAC communities for the most part. Weak parties mostly milk the people
who come to meetings for additional contributions. Stronger parties tend to
spread out to other individuals, but it's usually a very individually oriented
system of financing. The one thing that local party organizations have is
manpower, and when they can provide manpower to a campaign, they have
something to bargain with.
Basically the local parties consist of several subsets of activists. First, there
are the Young Republicans and College Republicans who provide most of the
manpower. They're the ones who make the street campaigns work. They put
up the signs, deliver stuff door-to-door, and make the telephone calls. The
Virginia Federation of Republican Women provides a lot of help staffing
campaigns, organizing events, and carrying out the day-to-day activities of the
parties. Finally, you have ideologically driven people who tend to appear at
election times, but do not to stick around afterwards. What is needed is a
restoration of strong party leadership to use these resources effectively.
In former days, a strong mayor or other local official would get elected and
a friend of his would become party leader. They would then work through
patronage and the party leader's strength would flow from this relationship.
To a certain extent, new party leaders still gather strength from incumbent
office holders. But the key is to merge the candidate's organization with
other groups so as to produce something more permanent. Then you have an
organization that can be used not only when the incumbent is running for
reelection, but for the other county and local races as well.
rn give you several examples of how weak party organizations create
problems even for media and mail-driven campaigns. When Stan Parris ran
for governor in 1989, there was a very bitter three-way primary. He had good
media and spent a lot of money on it, and ended up winning most of the
major urban centers in Virginia. He won northern Virginia, Richmond, and
Charlottesville, but he had no organization. As a result, he got less than 9
percent of the vote in the rural areas of Virginia, and he came in third in the
three-way primary.
In 1990, when Parris ran for reelection to Congress, this lack of
organization came back to haunt him in his own backyard. He did poorly in
Prince William County, which had given 63 percent of the vote to Bush, 55
percent to GOP gubernatorial candidate Marshall Coleman (who Jost to Doug
Wilder in 1989), and 65 percent to Parris in the past. The local organization
had collapsed and there was no one to drive out the vote. Consequently,
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Parris was only able to tie his opponent in the county and lost the election
when his opponent ran up a huge plurality in other parts of the district. The
bottom line is that in close elections, party organizations that can turn out the
vote are going to make the difference.
I think there is a resurgence of the local party organization in Fairfax
County, partly due to the frustration of losing, but also because of a strong
leader who emphasizes fighting Democrats instead of Republicans. He's been
out there organizing and revitalizing the party. For example, they are having
conventions for delegate races where four to five hundred people attend.
Several years ago, they didn't have four to five hundred people vote in the
primary for these offices. I think the trend is definitely up because of strong
leadership.
The number one problem in Virginia has been losing. You can make a
great case that the more you Jose elections, the weaker your party becomes.
It becomes a vicious cycle because you can't strengthen the party until you
start winning. The Virginia Republican Party has been disintegrating rapidly
ever since it lost the gubernatorial election to Chuck Robb in 1981. It has
now lost three in a row, and the party has become weaker and weaker and
weaker. This is why you have to break the cycle with a strong candidate, but
if you are not careful, victory can become a one time phenomenon. If you
don't build up a party organization around it, electoral success cannot be
sustained. My belief is that the only way you can continue to win in a state
like Virginia is by organizing at the bottom, generating the enthusiasm at the
local level, and restoring strong local party organizations. Despite the
current thinking from many political scientists about media influence and
direct mail, I would maintain that the foundation for persistent electoral
victories is a strong local party organization.

Les Frances (Executive Director, Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee):
I'm delighted to be here this afternoon. Actually, I so enjoyed John
Pitney's comments about the RNC that I was just going to sit back and let him
have another 15 minutes. John said he could have served on either panel, but
this is not true for me. I am a full fledged, 100 percent political hack, and not
much of a scholar or theoretician. My experience over the last 25 years has
been as an organizer, a campaign manager, the Executive Director of the
Democratic National Committee and now the Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee, as well as about 10 years in the private sector as a
political and legislative consultant.
I'm going to take a different tack, not knowing what my counterpart, Tom
Cole, is going to do. I'm going to talk about the 1992 cycle and how we at the
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DCCC are preparing to engage in political combat over the next 14 or 15
months. Hopefully, through this process you will be able to draw some
conclusions about organizational elements and trends in our committee.
Let me state a couple of obvious thin~. The first is that 1992 is going to
be a very crucial election year. It is the first presidential election since 1972
to come at the same time as a redistricted Congress and state legislatures.
We have thirty-five U.S. Senate races, including two in California and in many
of the other "megastates." In addition, we have the usual 435 House races,
the literally thousands of state legislative, and tens of thousands of local races
around the country. So it's a big year, to put it mildly.
On the House side, we plan for the prospect of as many as 100 fully
competitive House races. The press has reported that as 100 open seats.
Nobody is talking about 100 open seats, but rather the possibility of something
around 100 competitive races. How do we get to that number? I'm ashamed
to say it in front of this group, but our calculations have included hardly any
scientific methodology whatsoever. There are 300 House seats where one of
the following three factors are at play: the 1990 victory margin was less than
60 percent, the margin of victory between 1988 and 1990 dropped by 10
percent or more, or due to redistricting there will be a net gain or net loss of
at least 50,000 residents. Taking a look at these factors, and what we know
about the districts from other research, we sort of massage that figure, and it
works down to around 100 competitive races for our planning and budgeting
purposes. These are the races where a major effort will be undertaken by
both parties and/or the candidates of both parties in 1992.
It's going to be a volatile election year, given the late start of the
presidential campaign, the long term political effects of the Persian Gulf War
and the changes in the Soviet Union, and the uncertain direction of the
economy. As we sit here, it is impossible to predict the impact of these
factors on races for the House of Representatives. Despite the uncertainty,
we remain confident about our chances of maintaining a Democratic majority
in the House.
We have three reasons for this confidence. First, we enter this cycle with
25 more seats than we had in 1981. Second, while President Bush's personal
popularity is high, those ratin~ are tied almost entirely to foreign events, and
thus his draw for "down-ticket" races is not expected to be strong. In fact, on
day-to-day issues that most Americans care about, such as jobs, long term
economic security, health care and education, the President scores poorly and
congressional Democrats do well. The third reason is that the political
machinery of the Democratic House, that is to say, the leadership structure,
their staffs, and the campaign committee, has consistently outdistanced our
Republican counterparts on the critical matters of candidate recruitment and
campaign services.
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By the way. there is a significant difference between the DCCC and the
Democratic Senate Campaign Committee. The Senate campaign committee
is by and large a funding operation. In contrast. we are much more heavily
into advice. counsel, and helping campaigns develop strategies. Some 50
percent of our effort goes into raising money for candidates and 50 percent
goes into providing less tangible kinds of service and assistance.
I'd be the first one to point out. however. that in the last cycle under Ed
Rollins and in the current cycle with Tom Cole and Spencer Abraham. the
NRCC bas made tremendous strides towards eliminating our edge. But
frankly. I think that we can hold on for at least one more cycle in terms of
candidate recruitment and campaign services. The Republicans will
outdistance us. as they always have. in terms of raising money, but I think we
will be able to continue to outscore them in local campaigns where, as the
phrase goes. the rubber hits the road.
Thanks to the very effective work of Tony Coelho during the first part of
the last decade, followed by Beryl Anthony in the latter part. the DCCC has
increased its organizational capacity tremendously. It also increased its
fundraising ability. Politically. the DCCC played a major role in helping
increase the Democratic majority in the House. as Paul Hermson's paper
shows. In special elections and in general elections the committee was deeply
involved and in almost every cycle we exceeded expectations. For example,
despite Bush carrying 40 states in 1988, Democrats picked up three seats in
the House. In 1990 Democrats held every one of their open seats and picked
up one-third of the Republican open seats. While those successes were
considerable, they weren't cheap.
When we began this election cycle we faced a pretty serious financial
situation. including a $3.2 million debt that had accumulated over the past
decade, Frankly. it was a debt that financed the political successes of the
decade. However, we had reached a point where we couldn•t finance our
operations through debt any longer. So we•ve concentrated on reducing the
debt. cutting costs at the committee, and increasing our fundraising. We have
reduced that debt by one-third, paying off about $1.4 million in the last eight
months. We've cut our costs by about $350.000 over the same point two years
ago. We•ve reinvested in and reinvigorated our direct mail fundraising
program, which had really much dried up for our committee (though not for
the DNC or for the DSCC). We have made a major effort to raise more
money outside the Beltway through big donor events in various cities.
In addition, our chairman, Vic Fazio, has done something quite novel. He
asked members of Democratic Caucus to contribute to the DCCC and to get
them to believe that the DCCC is their campaign committee. As a result. we
have raised in excess of $600.000 from caucus members. This resulted
exclusively because of the confidence the House leadership and membership
have in Vic Fazio's stewardship of the committee. It has made a major
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difference not just in our finances, but has sent a tremendous signal to the
rest of the Democratic financial community. In fact, we have raised more
money in the first six months of this year than any six month period in the
history of the DCCC.
We think we have laid the financial and organizational groundwork
necessary to move ahead. Soon, we will step up our recruitment of
candidates, which by the way, is a little later than usual time because of the
uncertainty of redistricting and reapportionmenL We will then begin a very
intense period of training candidates, both challengers and incumbents. We
will also complete the staffing of our political operation, including a field
office for the first time in California staffed by a senior political operative.
We'll also increase our direct mail even more. We're going into
telemarketing in a serious way for fundraising and high donor road events
featuring the Speaker and the Majority Leader in virtually every region of the
country. As I said, I think we are now ready for the 1992 cycle and there is
every reason to believe we will be active in the 100 or so competitive races
we face next year.

Tom Cole (Erecutive Director, National Republican Campaign Committee):
Let me break my remarks into three areas. First, I'd like to respond to
some of the interesting comments that I just heard. Second, I'd like to give
a quick look at how we organize at the National Republican Campaign
Committee, and the third, following very much in the outline of Les Francis'
comments, say how we look at 1992.
On the first point, I was struck by some of the remarks about local parties
because I really think of myself as a local party person. I used to be a state
party chairman, a state legislator, and have not been a Washington operative.
One of the things I would ask you to do in your research is to look beyond
parties and think in terms of partisan organizations. This is because there are
very few successful and politically significant local party organizations any
place in America. There are, however, lots of very effective partisan
organizations and I think that's where the Democrats hold a tremendous
advantage.
Political parties function every other year at election time and at odd
points in between. Other organizations, such as the National Education
Association and its state and local affiliates function all the time and in a very
political way. I doubt if Republicans will ever be able to come up with
ongoing organizations with the same cadre of workers, money, technical
support, and expertise. Trying to match the AFL-CIO headquarters with the
on and off county GOP headquarters down the street is like sending the
militia out to battle the regular army. It's just not the same contest because
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that union headquarters does something else besides play politics with
activists. It fulfills other very legitimate functions for its members, so when
it's time to play politics, union political operatives benefit from a lot of good
will.
These kinds of organizations are very effective and it has been difficult to
organize Republican counterparts. For example, when I was a state legislator,
I set up a PAC to help Republican candidates because the party could only
give so much money. It seemed to me a smart thing to do, but I got a lot of
flack from party activists about going outside the GOP organization. I
thought I was putting another partisan organization in place that could help
Republicans. One of the blinders on political scientists is to think in terms
of parties, not partisanship, which is much more important. Party activists
often do the same.
Each party has a variety of interest groups affiliated with it to one degree
or another. I think the Democrats have been more successful in penetrating
and holding these. We do very well with the Right to Llfe groups and the
NRA. But sometimes these organizations are infused with the idea that they
have to be "bipartisan." That's something that the NEA never, never, deludes
itself about. I don't care what they say publicly. I can watch the flow of their
money and that tells me where their heart is. I say this not as a criticism but
as a complimenL This is something our own side has not been very smart in
grasping.
Now, let me say a few things about our organization at the NRCC and
then about 1992. The question I am usually asked is, "What resources do you
provide candidates?• I break these resources up into four categories. The
first thing is cash and coordinated expenditures. We can give $10,000 to a
primary and general election, and up to $53,000 in coordinated expenditures.
Llke the DCCC, we like to think we do lots of other things that are more
important. It's amazing, however, what the candidates want when they come
in. It's very seldom our counsel or our technical assistance. It's often •Let's
see your wallet" and if you have some, it's amazing how influential you can be.
If you don't give any money, it doesn't matter how good your advice is, it's not
nearly as important as somebody else's advice who can back it up with a
check. Now, funding is a very important function, and one we tend to lose
sight of. I think the first mission of the national party organization is to
provide its viable candidates with as much financial support as it can. When
we do that, then we can go on to talk about other things that we can do for
them.
The second thing we do is provide cut rate services, particularly for
campaigns that can't afford the best pollster or the best media person. We
have an in-house director of survey research. We can tum around and make
an in-kind contribution of a survey that meets all the legal requirements, bas
got the same technical value, but might only cost $5,000 instead of $10,000 or
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$12,000. Those are great bargains for candidates if they are smart enough to
know how to use them. The same is true for media services.
After cash and assistance, there are lots of other things that we can do for
candidates that don't count against the spending limit. We can give them a
research package on their potential opponent, particularly if it happens to be
an incumbent, that's worth thousands of dollars. We also have training
schools. I happen to think they are very worthwhile endeavors for candidates.
These things don't count against our spending limit and don't cost the
candidate a dime, but would be very expensive if the candidate purchased
them directly. The last thing we can do is in the area of non-allocable
expenditures. Here our committee can spend money on the electoral
environment across the board to our advantage. These efforts can range from
national media efforts in cooperation with the RNC and Senatorial
Committee to voter programs where we provide generic ''Vote Republican"
literature.
The NRCC has changed a great deal in recent years. If you had
to divide it into time frames, the great divide for us was the middle 1970s.
Before that we were strictly an incumbent funding organization. With the
advent of direct mail and modem fundraising, we obtained the funds to do
lots of other things. We were one of the first organizations to get into direct
mail fundraising, ahead of the RNC and Senatorial Committee, although we
are now the weak sister of the big three. Since 1986, we've been operating
on reduced economic circumstances. There's a lot of reasons for that, but
basically people get tired of hearing that some day within their lifetime we
will talce control of the House of Representatives. It gets harder and harder
for us to say that with any credibility at all. As Mark Strand said, our political
strength depends on winning. Frankly, this election cycle is a very important
election cycle for us. We need to re-establish the belief that the NRCC can
malce a difference, that we can win and pick up seats.
Let me talk just briefly about 1992 because we don't see the terrain very
much differently than the DCCC. I do think it's going to be 100 plus
competitive races around the country. I do think we will have a lot of open
seats. The normal number is 25 to 30 and I think we'll be in the 50 to 60
range for a lot ofreasons. We approach this election cycle with a good deal
of optimism and hope without being naive.
I do not think the Republican Party has had a good national environment
in which to run congressional campaigns since 1984. The next year, 1986 was
an off-year with the tide quite naturally moving the other way. We did pretty
well however, only losing six House seats, because all our weak sisters got
killed in 1982. In 1988, George Bush's numbers were not particularly good
for House Republicans. It was a very intense, negative presidential campaign.
I'm not one of those that are critical of Lee Atwater and company because
they went negative and won. But these tactics did not build up an agenda that
worked down the ticket. I think this cycle will be somewhat different in that
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regard. Last cycle, 1990, was another off year complicated by the
controversial budget agreement.
Looking at 1992, what makes us optimistic? First is the President's
popularity. I agree that you can't rely on coattails, but I would rather have
a popular top of the ticket than an unpopular one. Second, for the first time
in a Jong time the generic strength of the two parties is about even, with 35%
to 40% of the electorate with each party. Third, this election cycle coincides
with the Presidential election that will maximize our turnout. Fourth, there
is anti-incumbent mood out there. Only a relatively small percentage of the
American public thinks that the Congress is doing a very good job and that
attitude hurts the Democrats. And finally, I think we are looking at a good
candidate crop on the Republican side. In our candidate recruitment, we are
not as close to the top of the universe as the Democrats. We have more seats
that we can potentially talk about as being winnable. Right now we have
about 430 identified candidates in about 300 districts around the country and
we don't even have district lines in a lot of states. We think that's pretty
good. It's well ahead of the pace that we've had the last three or four cycles.

